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Abstract 
 
Remote computing services on shared, third party platforms (e.g., virtualization and cloud 
services) offer advantages to organizations and individuals, putting at their disposal 
enormous computing resources while permitting them to pay only for the resources 
actually used. Unfortunately, such environments are prone to attacks by hackers, 
adversarial users of the systems, or even the owner of the service. Such attacks may 
address the operating system, hypervisor, virtual machine monitor (VMM), or even the 
hardware itself. It would therefore be extremely beneficial if users could ensure the 
security of their programs in such environments, as this would likely lead to a dramatic 
expansion of their use for applications ranging from research, through finance, and to 
medical systems. Specifically, the confidentiality of the code and data must be preserved, 
and tampering with those or with the sequence of execution must be detected.  
Although prior works suggested various ideas and architectures, they are missing key 
features for becoming practical and ubiquitous:  
a) Supporting existing application binaries 
b) Providing security without significant performance, power or cost penalties. 
c) Being scalable to many compute nodes 
In this work we present the Secure Machine, SeM for short, a CPU architecture extension 
for secure computing. SeM uses a small amount of in-chip additional hardware that 
monitors key communication channels inside the CPU chip, and only acts when required. 
SeM provides confidentiality and integrity for a secure program without trusting the 
platform software or any off-chip hardware. SeM supports existing binaries of single- and 
multi-threaded applications running on single- or multi-core, multi-CPU, or multi-node 
computing environment, and it is also extendable to accelerators (e.g., GPU, smart NICs), 
which allows the use of secure heterogeneous systems. The performance reduction 
caused by it is only few percent, most of which is due to the memory encryption layer 
that is commonly used in many secure architectures.  
 
We also developed SeM-Prepare, a software tool that automatically instruments existing 
applications (binaries) with additional instructions so they can be securely executed on 
our architecture without requiring any programming efforts or the availability of the 
desired program’s source code. 
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The development of SeM included the creation of several independent and important 
building blocks: 
To enable secure data sharing in shared memory environments, we developed Secure 
Distributed Shared Memory (SDSM), an efficient (time and memory) algorithm for 
allowing thousands of compute nodes to share data securely while running on an 
untrusted computing environment. SDSM shows a negligible reduction in performance, 
and it requires negligible and hardware resources. 
We developed Distributed Memory Integrity Trees, a method for enhancing single node 
integrity trees for preserving the integrity of a distributed application running on an 
untrusted computing environment. We show that our method is applicable to existing 
single node integrity trees such as Merkle Tree, Bonsai Merkle Tree, and Intel’s SGX 
memory integrity engine. 
All these building blocks may be used together to form a practical secure system, and 
some can be used in conjunction with other secure systems.  
 
SeM is thus an important step towards high performance, cost effective secure 
computing, which will allow wide usage of those for sensitive application.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1 Objective 
Security is a major concern in any shared (multi-user) computer system, and this concern 
is growing with the proliferation of shared third-party computing platforms, e.g., public 
clouds. A traditional key role of an operating system (OS) is to provide isolation among 
processes, but the trust in those has declined due to complexity, modularity, bugs, cyber-
attacks, and in some cases simply not trusting their owner. Ensuring privacy in such 
environments would therefore be extremely beneficial, enabling a dramatic expansion of 
their applicability to sensitive applications such as financial and medical systems. 
Specifically, maintaining the confidentiality of user code and data, and detecting any 
malicious alteration thereof, are key requirements.  
The goal of this research is to provide security for general purpose computing in a usable 
manner.  
Security essentially means the ability to send a (secure) program for execution on a 
remote computer, in which even a privileged attacker cannot inspect its code, data, or 
temporary data, and cannot alter with those or with the sequence of execution without 
being noticed. Some alterations are detected immediately, some will be detected as soon 
as the altered data or state is used, and some (e.g. alterations to results that are stored, 
not being touched again, and waiting to be shipped) will only be detected by the owner 
upon completion. (The threat model will be discussed shortly.) 
General purpose computing essentially means computers and CPUs as we know them 
today, supporting settings that are currently supported, running operating systems, 
hypervisors, and virtual machine monitors (VMMs) as we run today (with all their inherent 
services).  
Usable manner essentially means supporting existing programs, and running those with 
small performance and power overheads. 
The desired support for existing computing settings yields in a challenge of adding the 
abovementioned security while introducing only few changes to the system. A direct 
benefit of this approach is that the lesser the changes, the simpler it is to embed such 
solutions into existing systems. Additionally, performance and power are often heavily 
harmed for added security, yet we strive to minimize the overheads in those. 
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2 Threat Model 
The user possesses a private computer, which is trusted and is assumed to be completely 
protected against any attack. In the shared remote computer(s) (“the computer”), an 
adversary: 
• Completely controls the OS/VMM/hypervisor, running in the most privileged ring, 
including the ability to change or implant code both in advance and during runtime. 
• Has physical access to off-CPU signals on the board, memories and I/O, and an ability 
to monitor, alter, or emulate any of those, including the communication network. 
• Before, during and after execution, may try to read or change user code, data and 
results, or interfere with the OS services that the program receives. 
• Cannot physically inspect or alter CPU chip internals (including on-chip cache). This 
chip (hardware) is assumed to be correct, and its manufacturer is trusted so that 
silicon-internal secrets stored during manufacturing are not leaked. 
 
Remark. Alterations of the untrusted OS services (Iago attacks [55]), if called intentionally 
by the user program, are unavoidable and can only be detected by the user program. In 
defense, the user can use shims that verify return values [2,13,14,40], submit an entire 
verified OS with his code, or use secure boot to validate the authenticity of the OS [15]. 
User program bugs are not addressed here. Side and covert channel attacks [51,19] are 
important, but are not addressed here, though solutions suggested in other works are 
applicable to SeM as well. Denial of service [23] is possible, as the platform owner may 
simply shut it down.  
3 Main Contributions 
To address the abovementioned goal, we identified several parts of computer systems 
that need to be considered. 
First, we address the case of a single-core CPU that runs single-threaded programs 
securely on platforms in which everything (hardware and software) is untrusted, except 
for the CPU and its on-chip cache. For this setting we present the Secure Machine (SeM) 
(Chapter 2). SeM is a CPU architecture extension that is largely CPU-architecture agnostic, 
and it requires only small modifications to existing CPUs (mostly between major CPU 
blocks). By a novel binding of code and data that are under the same cryptographically 
validated (proven) ownership, SeM assures that only the owning code can access its data 
in a manner that no other software, privileged as it may be, can break. Using the 
 
15 
 
ownership proof, SeM automatically and quickly switches between security modes. SeM 
provides secure execution for existing program binaries, and its performance and power 
are similar to a system with no security. 
Next, we addresses parallel execution on single- and multi-core CPUs, and multi-
computer settings, where for parallelism we refer to the multi-threading programming 
model. We therefore add node-to-node secure communication, and hardware assisted 
secure thread creation, migration, and termination (Chapter 3).  Supporting multi-node 
secure computation, we also address heterogeneous systems containing Secure 
Accelerators. 
We developed SeM-Prepare, a tool that automatically and statically instruments existing 
binaries, thereby making them SeM-ready (Chapter 5). To our knowledge, SeM is the only 
secure architecture that accepts unmodified binaries, where the ones that come closer 
(Haven [43] and Graphene [49]) support unmodified source code, and thus require the 
program’s source code and recompilation. For evaluation purposes, we developed SeM-
Simulator, a tool that runs SeM-ready binaries, simulating SeM’s behavior, and collects 
statistics (Appendix A).  
To run multi-threaded programs on a multi-computer environment, a memory sharing 
model must be set. Since multi-threaded programs share data using a shared memory 
space, distributed shared memory [80] (DSM) is the native setting to choose. With the 
assumption of compute nodes that are connected via an untrusted medium, a security 
layer has to be added to protect shared data in between the compute nodes. For that, we 
present Secure Distribute Shared Memory (SDSM) (Chapter 6). By hiding the encryption 
latency behind the inherent communication latencies, SDSM can serve thousands of 
compute nodes with negligible performance reduction (compared to DSM with no 
security); by smart allocation of resources, SDSM minimizes the hardware resources and 
extra work added for encryption. 
Finally, although SDSM protects the confidentiality and integrity of data blocks during 
their transfer between compute nodes, protecting the integrity of a distributed program 
(for blocks that are not necessarily transferred) requires additional measures. 
Traditionally, integrity trees are used to protect the integrity of programs running on 
single compute nodes. We present the Distributed Integrity Trees (DIT), for extending 
existing integrity trees to support distributed settings, by adding a per-node integrity 
verified view of the coherence state of memory blocks (Chapter 7). While adding support 
for distributed settings, DIT adds no overhead on top of existing single-node integrity 
trees. 
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Together, these form a complete secure execution system that can be practically adopted 
into cloud systems, allowing to securely and efficiently run existing (and future) 
sequential or parallel programs.   
4 Related Work 
In this section we review related work and compare it with SeM's goals. 
Proposed solutions for running a secret workload on an untrusted machine rely on trusted 
hardware, and some also on trusted software. Each type has different inherent 
properties. 
Trusted software solutions. Some, e.g. InkTag [14], run a trusted hypervisor; Overshadow 
[2] and PrivExec [25] use trusted VMMs; Overshadow runs unmodified programs on an 
untrusted OS, by using trusted shims that are part of the trusted VMM. These shims 
mediate between the secure program and the untrusted OS, to enable the use of system 
calls. For thread creation, the shims prepare the new thread’s context, and sets the 
correct register values. Having some similarities in approach, its less strict threat model 
allows solutions that are inapplicable to SeM. Trustvisor [24] provides application 
separation on a trusted OS, and Virtual Ghost [40] recompiles the OS to insert hardware 
abstraction layer code. OP-TEE [85] is an open-source API to develop trusted applications. 
Although software based solutions provide many insights and tools, they are inherently 
susceptible to attacks on or by an untrusted service provider; SeM thus differs critically in 
the assumed threat model.  
Hardware based solutions require hardware modifications, but offer stronger 
capabilities, most notably secure compartments. E.g., [4,5,20,41] protect a VM (Bastion 
[20] is a hardware attested software solution), while SeM protects at process granularity. 
Finer granularity serves con-current adversarial programs without an OS for each, thus 
having less code in the trusted code base (TCB), making it more reliable (fewer bugs). 
XOM [1] protects at process granularity, but suffers from performance and applicability 
issues, and has vulnerabilities like memory integrity. AEGIS [3] and SecureBlue++ [18] 
solved its vulnerabilities and improved performance, but unlike SeM, still exhibit large 
performance degradation. Komodo [84] uses a hardware-software solution, where 
hardware maintains encryption and cache separation, and software manages virtual 
enclaves. Sanctum [86] is also a hardware-software solution that aims at protecting 
against memory access pattern leaks and cache timing attacks, but it does not address 
physical attacks of any kind. SecureME [28] relies on a verified machine state using secure 
boot, and SICE [35] relies on trusted BIOS, both are producing a hash for attesting the 
machine state. However, state verification of the OS and drivers is problematic, as 
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updates lead to new (therefore untrusted) state. Others assume that the machine is 
mostly maintained against hostile activities [6] (e.g. a rogue employee), or protect only 
one process at a time [41]. Iso-X [13] isolates at page granularity, requiring explicit 
programmer guidance for which areas to protect. [13,20,21] do not address hardware 
attacks. Unlike SeM, none support parallel or distributed computing, or dynamic job 
migration. 
Intel's SGX [22], addressing SeM’s threat model, allows an unprotected process to 
instantiate a small secure memory region, dubbed enclave. Enclaved code and data are 
protected from software and hardware attacks. SGX2 [54] specifications add dynamic 
memory allocation, enclave runtime permission management, and lazy loading of code 
into an enclave. Operations inside an enclave are limited, and costly overhead for 
entering/exiting the enclave has been spotted as a major performance bottleneck [26,52]. 
Furthermore, although SGX uses counter mode encryption, its integrity tree protects the 
data directly [81] (in a Merkle Tree [72] manner) rather than the counters (in a Bonsai 
Merkle Tree [34] manner). This design choice limits SGX's supported memory range, and 
results in a reduced caching efficiency for the integrity tree, which thus harms 
performance. Using a Bonsai Merkle Tree version of MEE is therefore an opportunity for 
a better future SGX. SGX’s SDK directly targets applications developed for it, and these 
cannot run elsewhere, which breaks the x86/x64 compatibility. Software extensions to 
SGX, such as HAVEN [43] or Graphene [49], enhance its applicability up to running some 
unmodified code by adding LibOS to the enclave, and SCONE [27] addresses that using 
special Linux containers. Eleos [26] and Hotcalls [52] suggest performance enhancements 
by adding software optimizations, but the resulting performance is still very limited. SGX 
limits the number of active threads upon the creation of an enclave, so dynamic creation 
of new threads is limited, though SGX2's dynamic memory allocation will tentatively solve 
this problem. Furthermore, SGX threads cannot be migrated, even between different 
cores of the same CMP. In contrast, SeM fully supports threads conventionally, including 
thread migrations.    
5 Organization of This Thesis 
This rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 we first present the basic 
mechanisms of SeM, supporting single-thread single-core, and in Chapter 3 we extend it 
to support multi-threads and single- and multi-core and multi-node settings. In Chapter 4 
we discuss types of supported programs and another alternative of the use of shared 
library functions. In Chapter 5 we present the SeM-Prepare tool. Chapter 6 presents the 
Secure Distributed Shared Memory, and Chapter 7 presents Distributed Memory Integrity 
Trees. Finally, Chapter 8 offers concluding remarks.  
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In Appendix A we present our SeM simulator, and in Appendix B we provide a detailed list 
of SeM instructions. 
Throughout the thesis we use the term "cache blocks" when referring to "cache lines".  
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Chapter 2  
The Basic Secure Machine (SeM) 
1 Introduction 
In this chapter we describe the basic mechanisms of the Secure Machine (SeM), 
addressing single-threaded programs running on a single-core CPU. 
We consider a user with a trusted private computer, wishing to run his program on a 
remote computer such as a public cloud, which concurrently serves multiple (possibly 
mutually adversarial) users. The user sends a program, comprising code and data, for 
execution. It can be provided as files on disk or via a network, and program output is 
collected similarly. 
The remote computer's system software may be adversarial, and the only trusted 
hardware is its CPU chip (with its in-chip caches). Support for identity authentication is 
assumed (a certificate), merely enabling the establishment of a secure virtual 
communication channel between the user's trusted private computer and the remote 
trusted CPU chip. This is done using a secret signature key stored in the trusted CPU chip 
by some trusted agent, possibly the chip's manufacturer.  
In this setting, and without requiring OS modification, we wish to enable a user program 
to run conventionally on the remote machine: switch context in and out while maintaining 
its state, allocate memory dynamically, use I/O, and invoke system calls. All this while 
ensuring its confidentiality and integrity: its secrets (code, data, temporary values, and 
data communicated via I/O) cannot be discovered by any adversary (confidentiality); and 
its results, including any information that it sends to the outside world, are unaltered, or 
an alteration is detected (integrity). (Nonetheless, misbehaving untrusted OS services that 
are called by the user program can usually only be detected by a user program.) 
Overshadow [2], some of whose ideas we adopt, is a comprehensive solution that 
provides some of the above (e.g., securely running an unchanged application); however, 
as it is based on a trusted virtual machine monitor (VMM), it does not address an 
untrusted owner (which can manipulate the VMM, or track and modify memory). Another 
is Intel's SGX [22]; although it addresses an untrusted owner, its key challenges are 
applicability to existing programs, resource efficiency, and performance reduction that is 
partly caused by expensive security mode switch operations (EENTER, EEXIT). Software 
extensions to SGX include PANOPLY [56] (helps develop SGX applications), Haven [43] (for 
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Windows) and Graphene [49] (Linux); these two accept unmodified applications but 
impose various restrictions on the programs, require a large TCB, and substantially 
degrade performance. SCONE [27], a small-TCB container-based solution for running 
unchanged applications, comes closer to achieving the goal. However: the user needs to 
know security-related aspects of the service to create an image from application binaries; 
customized support for libraries that use system calls must be developed (currently only 
libc); performance drops by tens of percents; and it is unclear whether it supports signals 
and exceptions. Chapter 1 reviews additional related work.  
We present the Secure Machine (SeM), an extended CPU architecture enabling secure 
computing on a computer that is managed by an untrusted entity, jointly addressing the 
aforementioned needs without any restrictions on the flow of the system or on the 
untrusted OS/VMM/hypervisor. (By abuse of terminology, we use the term SeM to refer 
both to the architecture extension and to the resulting extended architecture, with the 
meaning being obvious from the context in each case.) SeM can easily be integrated into 
any CPU architecture, and incurs only tiny performance, power, and area penalties. We 
use prior-art memory encryption and integrity [34], and add a novel cache and register 
management layer, as well as setup and termination capabilities. 
In a nutshell (and ignoring setup), a secure program invokes its trusted instructions, and 
accesses its trusted data. When the need arises (e.g., OS kernel code for performing a 
context switch), it invokes an untrusted instruction, at which time the secure program’s 
registers are immediately hidden by SeM at a tiny cost (Sec. 2.4). The trusted cached 
blocks are only accessible by same-process trusted code, so the trusted memory space is 
protected (Sec. 2.3). When a trusted instruction is subsequently invoked (e.g., returning 
to user code), the registers are restored immediately. As done in previous works, memory 
blocks that are fetched or evicted are automatically protected by a memory encryption 
and validation layer. 
SeM’s main novel protections are its ability to automatically hide register values on the 
first invocation of an untrusted instruction, and its ability to block untrusted memory-
access instructions from accessing trusted cached blocks. SeM’s main novel performance 
benefits are its ability to hide and restore the registers’ data in a single clock cycle, and 
fast context switches without flushing the cache. SeM’s novel applicability benefits are 
that the CPU is largely unchanged, the security mechanisms are hidden from the program 
and the unmodified OS, and the programmer need not modify the application code.   
We designed and implemented SeM-Prepare, a tool running on the user's trusted 
computer for preparing existing binaries for SeM (running offline or in the course of 
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program submission to the cloud, sometimes referred to as application deployment). This 
tool is described in detail in Chapter 5.  
Then, we run SeM-Prepare on the SPEC CPU2006 benchmark suite [57] binaries to make 
them SeM-Ready. We designed and implemented SeM-Simulator to execute the resulting 
binaries, thereby demonstrating completeness and correct results, and showing 
overheads to be negligible. The simulator is described in detail in Appendix A. 
This chapter focuses on the core architecture and on the protection of the user’s process 
from (software and off-chip hardware) adversaries. Extensions to support multi-thread, -
core and –node settings, as well as task and thread migration are discussed in the next 
chapter. 
The key building blocks contributed by this work are: 
• A novel hardware-maintained secure process context management, allowing efficient 
and secure switching between programs, and between the program and the OS. 
• Secure Access, a novel method for cache access control, coupling authenticated 
instructions and authenticated data; this allows unencrypted code and data of 
adversarial programs to securely co-reside in cache. 
• An automatic tool for preparing existing binaries for SeM; no programming efforts are 
required.  
2 The SeM Architecture 
2.1 Overview  
The basic Secure Machine (Figure 1) comprises a single-core multi-user computer. SeM's 
main hardware is the Security Management Unit (SMU). It exclusively manages and 
controls access to the CPU registers (Sec. 2.4) and caches (Sec. 2.3) in an on-chip physical 
domain dubbed the Trusted Area (TA), and serves as a gatekeeper between the TA and 
the untrusted world.  
To ensure confidentiality, the user’s code and data are encrypted whenever outside the 
TA and, for integrity, are signed using a Message Authentication Code (MAC). We use a 
counter mode (CM) technique for memory encryption, and a lightweight secure hash for 
authentication (MAC); GCM [33] is an authenticated encryption technique that provides 
both. We use Bonsai Merkle Tree (BMT) with a TA-resident root hash [34] to keep the 
integrity of the CM seeds. All these are widely used in previous works, and have been 
proven safe and efficient (in performance and memory footprint) [33,34]. SeM is agnostic 
to the memory encryption and authentication techniques, as long as these provide 
memory confidentiality (when desired) and integrity breech indication (mandatory).  
 
22 
 
CM encryption protects the memory at cache block granularity by assigning a seed value 
(commonly 64 bits) for each block’s virtual address; these seeds are cached. BMT is a hash 
tree used for maintaining the integrity of the seeds, so that an old data block with its 
corresponding old seed cannot be injected into memory. The BMT blocks are also cached, 
so only missing BMT nodes (rather than the entire hash tree) need to validate when 
fetched. Each CM counter protects an entire data block, and each BMT hash (last layer) 
protects an entire CM counters block, so both natively experience far better locality than 
normal data blocks. The performance implication of those is small [33,34], and is not 
unique to SeM. 
Both CM encryption and BMT require memory for metadata (encryption seeds and a hash 
tree). This memory need not be protected, because an attacker is unlikely to inject correct 
values without holding the secret keys [33,34]. These small regions are allocated and 
zeroed at the secure program's request, and discarded when the program finishes or 
crashes; if the OS fails to cooperate, an error is detected upon access. The SMU performs 
these operations using metadata (e.g., secret encryption and authentication keys) stored 
securely for each secure program during its setup. As in many other secure architectures 
[3,7], CPU debugging (which exposes detailed state), is disabled for a secure program. 
SeM can be tailored to either physically or virtually addressed caches. (By "virtually 
addressed caches" we refer to virtually indexed caches with either virtual or physical 
tags.) When fetching a missing block, its virtual address is known in both cases. When 
evicting, a virtually addressed cache can store the updated seed immediately, but a 
physically addressed cache needs to perform a reverse TLB lookup to find the correct seed 
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Figure 1: SeM hardware block diagram 
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to update; this can be done in the background, without delaying the actual eviction. From 
here on we assume virtually addressed caches. 
The rest of the computer is largely unmodified. The OS can start and stop processes, 
switch among them, and perform any conventional OS task, but it only accesses the cache 
under SMU supervision. Likewise for the hypervisor or any layer between a user program 
and the actual CPU hardware. 
The flow (e.g., submitting to the cloud, part of the ‘secure cloud deployment’): A user 
program’s binary (in his own trusted computer) is statically linked with shared library 
functions that it requires (similarly to [55]), and is then automatically instrumented with 
some additional instructions (explained later). Next, it is encrypted and signed, and is then 
sent to SeM through an untrusted medium. To execute the program, a secure connection 
is established between the user’s computer and the SMU to securely store the program’s 
settings (e.g., keys) in the SMU. This enables the SMU to provide each secure program 
with encryption, decryption and authentication services for code and data using the 
program’s unique keys. The program is then executed, using these keys. Upon 
completion, the user may collect the encrypted output and validation information from 
the SMU.  
Many previous works required attestation of the machine's cumulative state [28,35]; this 
state is very hard to verify, as it varies among systems and changes with system updates. 
(E.g., each OS update modifies OS executables, resulting in a different state hash.) In SeM, 
we use simple attestation to authenticate the existence of a genuine SMU, regardless of 
the state of the machine. This is easily doable using a publicly provable signature [11] (Sec. 
1); e.g., by requesting the SMU to sign a requestor-generated random number.  
SeM runs an untrusted management program for direct communication with the 
(possibly remote) user. Data passing through the management program is safe, as it is 
encrypted and the decryption keys are only known to the SMU. 
2.2  Security Management Unit (SMU) 
The SMU is SeM's core hardware. It resides in the CPU chip, situated between the last 
level on-chip trusted cache and the rest of the memory system, and between the L1 cache 
and the execution unit. It creates a boundary between the TA (comprising the execution 
unit, registers, trusted caches, etc.) and the untrusted domain (comprising optional 
untrusted cache levels and everything that resides off-chip). The SMU's main roles are: 
Securely store and manage cryptographic keys; 
Hide and restore register values upon switching between different modes of operation 
(secure / non-secure); 
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Enforce the memory access control; 
Decrypt (encrypt) cache blocks upon entry into (eviction from) the TA, and maintain their 
integrity; 
Figure 2 depicts the SMU: on the left, it is connected to the untrusted levels of the 
memory hierarchy, and on the right ---to the TA (execution unit and on-chip caches). The 
SMU comprises encryption and decryption units for both symmetric (e.g. GCM) and 
asymmetric (e.g. RSA [11]) ciphers, signing and signature validation units (e.g. GHASH and 
RSA), a key table, and a small storage, dubbed the SMU Sealed Storage (SSS), for 
temporary data. The asymmetric cipher is used to establish a secure connection between 
the user's computer and the SMU for sending the program’s encryption and 
authentication keys to store in an SMU table. 
When a program first launches, it attaches its process ID to this SMU table entry (Sec. 5). 
The program's code and data are encrypted using symmetric CM encryption (GCM), and 
are signed using a secure MAC (GHASH). As will be explained in detail in Chapter 6 [36], 
whenever the seed is zero, the memory block's virtual address serves as the seed for 
encryption pad creation. Since the seed memory is initialized to zeros, this obviates the 
need to supply initial seeds with the program. Also, non-zero seeds are concatenated with 
‘1’ during encryption pad creation, so initial and runtime encryption pads are never the 
same. Upon a last-level cache miss in the TA, the SMU uses the symmetric decryption and 
authentication units to decrypt and authenticate incoming blocks. Modified cache blocks 
are encrypted and signed upon eviction from the TA, preserving their secrecy and 
integrity. 
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Figure 2: SMU block diagram 
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Enforcing memory access control ensures that only the (same-process) secure code can 
access its secure data. This is the core of SeM’s protection against software attacks, which 
nonetheless allows blocks belonging to mutually adversarial applications to co-reside in 
the cache, unencrypted (Sec. 2.3). This requires that upon initiation of a new secure 
process, the SMU clear existing secret cache blocks of the same PID (possibly of an old 
secure process). Sec. 3 discusses some attacks on SeM, including an attack by an 
adversarial OS. 
The SMU operates in two modes: Trusted and Untrusted (Sec. 2.4). In Trusted mode, it 
expects to run only the secure program, namely run secret instructions. In Untrusted 
mode, it expects to run untrusted code, such as a non-secure application or the OS, where 
the latter may run from within the context of the secure application (e.g., during an 
interrupt or a system call). The SMU uses these operating modes to provide the register 
access control. Switching between modes and register maintenance are discussed in Sec. 
2.4. 
The SMU table holds the keys and configurations for the secure programs. Each table 
entry contains (Table 1):  
 
Upon launching of a process containing the Process Hash (more in Sec. 5), its PID is stored. 
If a table entry with this PID already exists, it is erased, and any secure remnants of the 
same-PID program are removed from the TA. The table entry must remain in the SMU 
throughout the execution of the secure application, even when it is not active (for cache 
evictions, if required), so the size of this table limits the number of concurrent secure 
 
PID The process ID of the secure program using this entry.–  
Skey A symmetric key for memory encryption 
Mkey A symmetric key for memory authentication, if needed (e.g., 
GHASH uses Skey for both) 
Root Hash The root value of the BMT for integrity 
Process Hash Secure process hash, used to connect the secure process with its 
table entry 
First LEP The address of the first secure instruction 
Sig LEP Signal handling entry point 
Error Status Holds the error code 
 
Table 1: SMU table entry content 
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applications. However, a typical SMU table entry is 256 bits, allowing many secure 
programs to run concurrently using a small in-chip memory. 
The SMU executes special instructions, required for SeM’s operation, these are described 
in detail in Appendix B. Throughput this thesis, these instructions cannot be used to gain 
OS privileges nor can they bypass the OS's process separation, so they cannot harm other 
processes. They serve to perform security operations for the secure program, and only in 
its address space and security domain. For security reasons, these are treated as fences 
in out-of-order CPUs. Some are automatically added to the program’s code as it is 
submitted for execution (sparsely), and some are used by the untrusted setup application. 
2.3 Secure Access 
We now present a novel cache access management approach that allows adversarial 
applications' blocks to concurrently reside in cache unencrypted, while maintaining 
complete isolation. SeM runs multiple unrelated processes. Our encryption and 
authentication scheme is based on per-secure-process secret keys stored inside the SMU, 
which decides whether to grant a given program encryption and decryption services for 
any given cache block and whether to grant it access to cache (cleartext) blocks. We 
discuss unified caches for instructions and data, but separate ones behave similarly. 
Instructions and data required for execution must be fetched into the CPU’s clear cache, 
residing in the TA. If there is an SMU table entry containing the current process ID, the 
encrypted block is decrypted using the corresponding decryption key, and its MAC is 
checked. If correct, the clear block is considered authentic and is stored in the TA with an 
Auth=True mark; else, the originally fetched block is stored in the TA with Auth=False, 
and is considered non-authentic. This is done at cache block granularity, and only upon 
cache miss. Upon eviction from the TA, authentic blocks are encrypted and signed, while 
non-authentic ones are simply evicted (Figure 3). Wishing to support integrity only, 
encryption and decryption can be bypassed. A block's Auth bit is reset upon cache block 
eviction and purging, and is propagated between the clear cache levels with the block 
itself. Any program, privileged as it may be, only gets decryption services by the SMU 
using its own private keys, if exist. Consequently, although the operating system can 
access any of the program’s private memory outside the TA, secrecy is ensured 
(ciphertext).  
Decrypting a memory block with GCM requires its seed, which does not exist for untrusted 
code that runs under the context of the secure application. Therefore, the SMU shall only 
perform decryption attempts for memory blocks that have the required data. 
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The cache contains clear-text instructions and data, which may belong to unrelated 
processes and to different users. Each cache block's tag includes its PID, providing inter-
process isolation. Attacks by a malicious OS are discussed in Sec. 3. 
For data confidentiality in the clear cache, we employ Secure Access: authentic data blocks 
can only be accessed by (same-process) authenticated load/store instructions, and non-
authentic blocks can only be accessed by non-authentic instructions. Upon violation of 
Secure Access, the process halts and an error is declared.  
2.4 Mode Changing and Stack Management 
We now present a novel mechanism for automatic register hiding and maintenance, using 
the SMU modes. Any program starts running in Untrusted mode. If and when its secret 
code starts to execute, the SMU switches to Trusted mode. Interrupts may occur, 
suspending the secure program. Their handlers must run in Untrusted mode (their code 
is untrusted), so secret information is not leaked. Later, to resume execution, the SMU 
reverts to Trusted mode. 
Every program starts with a conventional non-secure stack, allocated by the OS. Secure 
programs also require a secure stack (protected for secrecy and integrity) for managing 
function calls in Trusted mode, so it is allocated (by the non-secure code) and initialized 
(by the secure code, as soon as it starts); these instructions are automatically added into 
the binary. Switching modes also switches between stacks. 
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A fetched instruction inherits the authenticity mark of its L1 cache block, and the SMU 
switches modes automatically to match the mark of the invoked instruction. When 
changing to Untrusted mode, the SMU first stores the contents of the registers (the secret 
context) in the SMU Sealed Storage (SSS), clears them, and changes the stack pointer to 
the non-secure stack). It also stores the address of the next authentic instruction to 
execute, dubbed the Legal Entry Point (LEP), the PID of the running process, and sets a 
validity mark for the content of the SSS (Pseudocode 1.) Then, the non-authentic 
(untrusted) code may execute safely. (In out-of-order CPUs, the untrusted instruction is 
delayed until the last trusted instruction fetched is committed and the registers are 
hidden, and the LEP is the address of the next instruction.) 
Attempting to execute an authentic instruction in Untrusted mode only succeeds if its 
address matches the process’ LEP and the data in the SSS is valid and matches the PID. If 
so, the SMU restores the register values and the secure stack pointer (the secret context) 
from the SSS, and changes the process to Trusted mode; else the program halts and an 
error is declared. In both cases, the SSS is invalidated. (Pseudocode 1.) By so doing, the 
SMU verifies that the secure program has resumed from its expected point of execution 
with the correct register values. (In Sec. 3 we add an LEP for handling signals.) Upon 
initiating a secure program, the SMU creates an empty secret context in the SSS (with the 
 
SMU_ChageToUntrustedMode (NextLEP) 
     LEP=NextLEP 
     Store secret context into SSS 
     Set SMU.SSS.valid = True 
     Clear registers 
     Mode=Untrusted  
 
SMU_ChangeToTrustedMode (InstAddr) 
    If (InstAddr==LEP) and (SMU.SSS.valid) and   
       (SMU.SSS.PID ==PID) 
 Restore registers from SSS 
 SMU.SSS.valid = False 
 Mode=Trusted 
    else 
 Report error and halt 
Pseudocode 1: Operations performed by the SMU (by hardware) during an 
automatic mode switch 
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first LEP from the SMU entry); only during the first switch to Trusted mode, the register 
values are preserved (not restored), but the entry point is enforced. 
Switching to Untrusted mode is fast: the registers may be cleared by simply switching a 
register window to a pending set of erased registers. The switched-out set of registers 
acts as the SSS, along with the LEP (which must be known for fetching the next instruction) 
and the PID. Switching to Trusted mode is also done instantly. Verifying the validity mark 
and comparing the PID are simple operations. Also, register values are restored by 
switching a register window. 
2.5 Sharing Data with Untrusted Code 
To receive services by untrusted code, such as some OS system calls, a secure application 
may need to reveal some of its data. The following SMU instructions allow only trusted 
code to bypass the Secure Access mechanism, so these instructions must be authentic to 
run.  
• SMU_StoreNA(address, data) – stores data into a memory block regardless of its Auth 
status, and sets its Auth bit to False, making it accessible to untrusted code. 
• SMU_LoadNA(address) – loads data from a memory block regardless of its Auth 
status, for importing untrusted data by trusted code.  
• SMU_InitA(addr, size) – stores zeros into an entire memory region of size size that 
starts at address addr; sets Auth bit to True for in-cache blocks; and signs and encrypts 
blocks that are not, used in conjunction with a write-no-allocate cache policy. Used 
for initializing allocated memory, so it is accessible by trusted code. 
3 Interactions with the Operating System 
3.1 Operating System Services  
SMU modes and Secure Access ensure that confidentiality is preserved even with 
unexpected invocation of untrusted code. However, the secure program runs 
concurrently with other (possibly adversarial) programs, so its context must be securely 
evicted (and later restored) on context switches. Also, although shared library functions 
are statically linked into the binary when prepared for SeM, system calls invoked by these 
functions must still be allowed to execute. Furthermore, dynamically allocated memory 
must get initialized to be used under Secure Access. Lastly, signals may be invoked and 
must be handled. All these are OS services, and are discussed in this section, including the 
required novel hardware.  
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3.1.1 Context Switch 
At context switches, the OS (untrusted) modifies the page table register (e.g., CR3 in Intel 
Architecture). A hardware watchdog normally exists, which invokes microcode upon page 
table register modifications [58]. We use this mechanism to also call SMU_EvictContext 
to evict the switched-out content of the SSS from the SMU into the process' memory 
(cache), and SMU_RestoreContext to restore the secure context of the switched-in secure 
program from memory back into the SSS. When evicted from the TA cache, the process’ 
memory protection is applied.  
In 64-bit systems, the size of the SSS is roughly 350 bytes, similar to a thread control block, 
requiring ~40 cycles for these instructions, which is negligible relative to the thousands 
required for a context switch [10]. 
Resuming execution of a secure program entails attempting to execute its next authentic 
instruction, which causes the SMU to verify its address and the SSS content (Sec. 2.4). If 
the OS refrains from updating the page table register on context switch, then the SMU 
evict and restore calls will not be invoked. Having multiple secure programs running on 
the machine, the PID check upon changing to Trusted mode will fail, causing the SMU to 
halt the secure program and to report an error. In any case, information is never leaked. 
SMU_EvictContext and SMU_RestoreContext are only required for secure programs; if 
called for a non-secure program, they finish immediately. 
3.1.2 System Calls 
External library functions are usable in SeM by statically embedding them in the SeM-
ready binary on the user's trusted computer. This assumes that the library functions are 
trusted to execute on the user's trusted computer, and we want to ensure that they are 
essentially unmodified when being used on SeM. Embedding these statically must be 
done recursively, so that embedded function A calling external function B will result in 
also embedding B.  
Many (normally external) services become trusted by static linking, but some external 
services require OS assistance at the far end by performing a system call. The code of the 
system call is provided by the OS, so it is untrusted (like the OS itself). Allowing system 
calls to run is a crucial requirement for the correctness of the program.  
Every OS and CPU architecture has its convention for invoking system calls. We focus on 
Linux [10] with System V AMD64 ABI [37], though the ideas can be adapted to any OS / 
architecture. Linux system calls are invoked via the syscall instruction, with the system 
call number passed in register rax. System call arguments are passed via the registers rdi, 
rsi, rdx, r10, r8, r9 (in order). Invoking syscall puts the return address in rcx, and the system 
 
31 
 
call’s return value is passed in rax. Unlike with function calls, the remaining registers are 
guaranteed to preserve their values. 
Because it is embedded into the SeM-ready binary, the syscall instruction is authentic 
(trusted), but the code of the system call is untrusted. Yet, to allow argument passing to 
the system call, the mode change for the system call code must not clear all registers; 
specifically, it must keep the required arguments and rcx (return address) in place. When 
done, the OS jumps back to the address in rcx (which is an LEP), and the secure programs 
resumes. We also require that switching to Trusted mode (if the last switch to Untrusted 
mode was for a system call) not restore the value of rax, since it holds the system call’s 
return value.  
Different system calls require different numbers of arguments. We must supply exactly 
the required number of arguments, since supplying fewer will harm its operation, and 
supplying more may reveal secret information. The number of arguments required for a 
system call can be discovered in the binaries (during the preparation phase) by noting the 
value of rax prior to syscall instruction (which always receives an immediate value prior 
to the syscall instruction) and comparing it with a list of known system calls. (In most 
cases, eax is set instead of rax, but because of the small range of system call numbers the 
outcome is the same, just with a smaller instruction.) Then, we replace syscall with 
SMU_syscall(argnum) instruction, argnum being the number of arguments for the system 
call. The SMU will keep the required argument registers untouched on the next switch to 
Untrusted mode, and then invoke syscall. The next switch to Untrusted mode is likely to 
occur on the first instruction of the actual system call code (since it is untrusted).  
A context switch occurring right after SMU_syscall() only delays the actual execution of 
the system call, but the OS should restore its registers (syscall arguments) before 
switching back (though SeM does not enforce that since it is executed in Untrusted mode, 
similarly to the system call). 
To avoid hard-coding the syscall convention in hardware, we use an SMU instruction that 
sets the syscall convention, using a bitmap of registers. This must be set per secure 
program (to prevent one secure application from attacking another), and must run as 
trusted code at the beginning of the secure program, so it is automatically embedded 
during the instrumentation process. 
Some system calls require pointer arguments for memory buffers or data structures (e.g. 
sys_write for file access). This requires a buffer copy to/from the untrusted memory 
before invoking the actual system call. We use dedicated wrappers for these, using 
SMU_StoreNA() and SMU_LoadNA(). The same holds for system calls that require 
complicated structs to be passed (e.g., serialization / deserialization for recvmsg()),  in 
 
32 
 
which case the wrapper must implement the required logic to perform such copy, 
sometimes replicating some of the original system call logic. In any case, it is always the 
secure program that reads/writes from/to its trusted memory region and writes/reads 
to/from the untrusted memory, and the system call always accesses the non-secure 
memory.    
Chapter 5 contains an in-depth discussion of the instrumentation process. 
The above approaches for passing the syscall arguments are similar to Overshadow [2] 
and SCONE [27], yet instead of shim functions we simply avoid clearing the desired 
registers on a mode change. In complicated system calls, our approach is similar to 
Overshadow's.    
3.1.3 Dynamic memory allocation 
Dynamic memory allocation is commonly required. Newly allocated memory must be 
accessible to the secure program, and its integrity must be kept. 
When allocating a new memory block, its content is usually zeroed by the OS (for security 
reasons); yet, when read by a secure program as if it is signed and encrypted, it will most 
likely fail the signature test and will be considered non-authentic, which would forbid 
storing new data into it by authentic store instructions (see Secure Access). Therefore, a 
newly allocated memory block is initialized (zeros) by the SMU_InitA instruction. When 
completed, memory blocks of the new region that are outside the TA contain zeros, 
signed and encrypted correctly, and blocks that happen to be in the cache contain zeros 
with Auth=True. 
We do that by implementing a sem_malloc(size) wrapper for malloc(), and replacing every 
call to malloc() with a call to sem_malloc() in the SeM-ready binary. Sem_malloc() 
essentially invokes malloc() with its original parameters; if successful, the newly allocated 
memory block is initialized by SMU_InitA. Pseudocode 2 shows a suggested C 
implementation for sem_malloc(). 
 
void* sem_malloc(size_t size)  
      void* retval;  
      retval = malloc(size); 
      if (retval) 
 InitA(retval, size); 
      return retval; 
Pseudocode 2: sem_malloc() implementation 
 
 
33 
 
When allocating a new memory block, the untrusted operating system must make sure 
that the memory required for this block’s metadata (CM encryption seeds and BMT 
hashes) has also been allocated. The seed memory is considered part of the OS memory 
(like the page table). Avoiding seed memory allocation will result in an error when 
accessed (if not allocated), as the SMU assumes its existence for allocated memory, so 
malicious or erroneous OS behavior will be caught.  
Previously allocated memory that was freed and then reallocated has seeds that are not 
necessarily zeros. Nonetheless, when initializing the reallocated memory, its seeds will be 
updated correctly upon cache eviction.  
Memory allocation may map a new virtual address to a previously used physical block. 
Without initialization, fetching a new memory block into the TA may require the seed of 
its previously mapped virtual address to validate correctly, so a MAC error is likely to 
occur. Therefore, every new memory allocation requires initialization.  
The free() process is unchanged, and a freed block will simply become available for future 
allocation. 
3.1.4 I/O Access 
I/O access is crucial in many applications. Two main considerations must be addressed 
when discussing I/O in SeM: 1) Passing memory buffers from/to the I/O device; 2) Data 
secrecy. We address files as the I/O mechanism, but the ideas can be adapted to other 
entities. 
File reads and writes are implemented over the sys_read and sys_write system calls 
(regardless of the actual API in use), both untrusted. They receive a file descriptor, a 
buffer pointer, and size. Sys_read natively receives a pointer to the secure memory, but 
it cannot write there. Similarly, sys_write is natively required to read from the secure 
memory but may not. These are examples of more complicated system calls, for which 
we use trusted wrappers, implanted during the automatic instrumentation of the 
application. The read wrapper allocates a non-secure memory region (by simple 
malloc(), if wasn't done before) and then reads data into it. It should then perform 
decryption and validation into the secure memory. Being a trusted function, it may 
approach both secure and non-secure regions. The write wrapper works the other way 
around. 
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Encryption and decryption are done by special functions, using a key that was supplied 
with the program when preparing it to run on SeM. These also require in-memory state 
to maintain I/O integrity. For performance and power efficiency, we suggest using the 
dedicated cryptographic instructions available in modern CPUs (such as Intel's AES-NI 
[59]). Pseudocode 3 shows a suggested C implementation for the read wrapper. 
 
3.1.5 Signal Handling 
Signals may be sent to any program during execution. In some cases, signal handling by 
the program is required (for specific signals), so the program registers a dedicated signal 
handler for these signals. When this signal is raised, the OS invokes the dedicated signal 
handler. When finished, it returns to the OS (by returning to rt_sigreturn system call that 
was pushed by the OS into the stack as the return address), and the program resumes 
execution from the point at which it was interrupted. The approach we use to handle 
signals is similar to the one of SGX [22]. 
To allow dedicated signal handlers for secure programs, SeM must support an additional 
LEP. In this LEP we place a trusted signal handling entry function (SHEF) that identifies the 
signal, runs the desired signal handler, and returns. If signal handling is required, a SHEF 
is automatically added to the program during its preparation for SeM, and the SHEF's 
address is set as a sig LEP in the SMU entry.  
Signal handler registration is done using the sys_rt_sigaction system call, so we use 
trusted syscall wrapper (automatically instrumented). The wrapper copies the sigaction 
struct to an untrusted memory buffer, and changes the handler's address to the SHEF's. 
 
ssize_t sem_read(int fd, void *buf, size_t count) 
    if ((!non_secure_buf) || (non_secure_buf_size < count)) 
 free(non_secure_buff); 
 non_secure_buf = (void*) malloc(count); 
 non_secure_buf_size = count; 
       int size_read = sys_read(fd, non_secure_buf, count); 
       int retval = decrypt(key,non_secure_buf, buf, size_read); 
       if (!retval) 
 error; 
       else 
         return size_read; 
Pseudocode 3: sem_read() implementation 
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It also registers an entry in a dedicated signal mapper that holds the address of the 
dedicated signal hander for this specific signal. 
Prior to setting a dedicated signal handler, signals are treated by the OS. After registering 
a signal handler, when the registered signal is raised the OS calls the SHEF, supplying 
information of the signal. If a dedicated handler exists in the signal mapper, then it is 
called. Calling the SHEF by the OS (untrusted code), the mode changes to Trusted but the 
register values are not restored, allowing the OS to pass signal information. To keep the 
signals handler's confidentiality, the SHEF uses a dedicated secure stack for handling 
signals; before returning to the OS, the registers are cleared, and the stack is restored to 
the one of the OS. 
3.2 Hostile OS Attacks and SeM’s Resilience  
An attacker may try to read or change code or data, rerun the secure program for various 
purposes, or even manipulate the secure context data or the flow of execution. These are 
all directly addressed by SeM's mechanisms. In this section we wish to discuss two 
privileged code attack examples that require further attention. 
Forged identity attack: Consider a privileged attacker (e.g., OS) that tries using the PID of 
a secure program to access its clear cache. The cache natively allows same-PID cache 
access, but Secure Access allows secret (authentic) data to be accessed only by same-
process authentic instructions; the attacker must therefore also properly encrypt its 
attacking code in order to gain access to the secret data. Not knowing the secure 
program’s secret keys, this is impractical.  
Iago attacks: These attacks use carefully chosen system call return values to manipulate 
library functions that are statically linked into the secure (and therefore trusted) program. 
[55] shows that manipulating brk() system call return value can cause malloc() to allocate 
an intended secure memory in a non-secure region, thus exposing data stored in it. In 
SeM, however, dynamically allocated memory always becomes secure memory, so data 
stored in it is always protected against leakage. Moreover, Iago uses return oriented 
programming (ROP) [60] to redirect the secure program to the attacker's code. However, 
if the ROP target is untrusted then automatic mode change will prevent any data leakage. 
Finally, Iago attacks may be defeated by checking system calls’ return values [13,14,40], 
which can also be done in SeM.    
4 Discussion 
Integrity with no Confidentiality. Program confidentiality is maintained by the 
mechanism of memory encryption, and its integrity is maintained by the mechanism of 
signature validation. Without the integrity mechanism, one cannot ensure that its own 
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program was indeed executed, because an attacker may forge data and instructions of 
its own, even ones that may intentionally uncover secret data; furthermore, Secure 
Access tightly depends on the integrity mechanism, so the in-chip per-process secure 
compartment cannot be maintained without it. Alternatively, SeM can operate in a 
mode during which only the integrity of a program is preserved, protecting against 
attempts to interfere with its correct execution. This mode is very similar to the one 
containing encryption, where the encryption and decryption blocks are simply bypassed 
in the SMU. Requiring no encryption also means that no encryption seeds are used 
(therefore not allocated), thus unlike the use of BMT, the integrity tree in use must 
protect the data blocks themselves (Merkle Tree). 
 
The Size of the Integrity-Protecting Metadata. The memory integrity protection 
mechanism uses a MAC for protecting each memory block, and a hash tree (with a root 
in-chip hash) for protecting the encryption counters. Assuming that all the protecting 
metadata currently resides in the off-chip (untrusted) memory, a cache miss will cause 
the fetching of the encryption counter and its validating nodes of the hash tree, and 
once the cache block was decrypted, it is validated using its MAC. 
The sizes of the MACs and hash values in the hash tree are important for quantifying the 
probability of a successful attack. Furthermore, only a single failing attack is allowed, 
since an integrity error will immediately halt the program and no further attempts will 
be allowed. 
The MAC directly protects the memory block against an attacker that modifies its 
encrypted version while in the untrusted memory. Because we use counter mode 
encryption, flipping a bit of a memory block that resides in the untrusted memory will 
result in flipping the same bit in the decrypted version. Since the MAC is calculated using 
a secure hash (and its key is assumed to be unknown to the attacker), the probability for 
successfully modifying the encrypted block and going unnoticed is 1/𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠_𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀).  
Therefore, the size of the MAC should be determined to achieve a desired probability. 
For evaluation purposes, we chose a 16 bit MAC. 
The hash tree protecting the encryption counters, where the leaf hash directly protects 
a block of counters, and the ancestor hashes protect their children hash blocks. 
Reverting a memory block with its MAC and its counter to an old value (ensuring that 
the MAC will validate correctly) will commonly result in a new leaf hash, which will most 
likely result in new hashes until the root of the tree (which resides in-chip, therefore 
impossible). Wishing to keep the hash tree unchanged, the success rate of reverting the 
memory block with its MAC and counter to old values is 1/𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠_𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠ℎ). Similarly to 
the MAC, the size of the hashes should be determined to achieve a desired probability. 
For evaluation purposes, we chose 16 bits hashes.  
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5 Quantitative Evaluation 
In this section, we evaluate SeM's performance reduction, increase in power 
consumption and additional hardware (area). 
5.1 Performance Evaluation 
We developed SeM-Prepare, a tool that automatically and statically instruments existing 
binaries, thereby making them SeM-ready. We also developed SeM-Simulator, a tool that 
is able to run SeM-ready binaries, simulating the SMU’s behavior, and collecting statistics. 
These are described in detail in Chapter 5 and Appendix A, respectively.  
SeM's overhead on program execution is in memory access (encryption/decryption), 
memory allocations (secure initialization), and system call wrappers (only when wrappers 
are needed). The system (OS) oriented overhead is for the context switch (merely ~1.02X 
the non-secure context switch, Sec. 3). All these have a negligible effect on unmodified 
performance-critical elements such as the cache (flushes are not required) and branch 
prediction, and none at all on the execution units. Also, mode changes impose no 
overhead (Sec. 2.4). 
We instrumented the integer programs of the SPEC CPU2006 benchmark suite [57] using 
SeM-Prepare, and then ran it on SeM-Simulator. SPEC CPU2006 was chosen because it 
targets the causes for overheads in SeM. Although SPEC CPU2006 also has floating point 
benchmarks, we only use SPEC’s integer benchmarks, because SeM is agnostic to the type 
of numeric operations that it performs.  
Performance is measured relative to the corresponding non-secure application. Overhead 
caused by memory encryption and authentication, including memory accesses for 
fetching missing GCM seeds, their BMT hash authentication, and cache contamination, 
comes inherently from the chosen memory encryption and authentication technique (and 
its implementation), as in any secure architecture; we therefore rely on previous works' 
simulations [33,34] for these.  
Figure 4 shows the performance penalty with and without memory encryption relative to 
no security at all (running the benchmarks unchanged). The mean penalty is under 1.9%, 
of which 1.8% is for memory encryption, so SeM adds merely 0.1%. (I/O traffic and 
allocated memory are also in Figure 4.) Thus, no other solution (past or future) can do 
much better. 
All programs successfully changed modes, invoked system calls, used files, and allocated 
secure memory. Finally, we verified that the SeM-ready benchmark results matched the 
original ones. Besides evaluating SeM's performance, this also serves as a strong 
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indication for the applicability of SeM to existing binaries, without requiring programming 
effort. 
 
5.2 Memory, Area, and Power Overheads 
 
Additional memory footprint depends on the chosen size of the seeds, MACs, and 
hashes, and also on the size of cache blocks. To estimate the memory footprint overhead, 
we use commonly used settings. We assume cache blocks of 64 Bytes, 64-bit per-block 
counter, 16-bit MACs and 16-bit hashes, and a 64-bit system. Each counter block protects 
32 memory blocks, and each hash block protects 128 counter blocks, so a hash block 
protects a memory region with the same 44 LSbs. Therefore, the hash tree is composed 
of 7 levels, including the in-chip root hash; each level is 128 times smaller than the 
previous (excluding the in-chip root hash which is 16 bit). In view of the extreme size drop 
of each added hash level relative to the previous (a factor of 128), we only count the first 
(larger) level of hashes. Therefore, using M bytes of memory will result in: 
𝑀𝑀
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
∙ (𝑀𝑀𝑜𝑜𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) + 𝑀𝑀
𝐵𝐵𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠∙
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
∙ (ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) [Bytes] 
 
Figure 4: Results for running SPEC CPU 2006 on SeM - percents of performance 
reduction, memory allocations, and I/O operations, per instruction. 
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Where 𝑀𝑀
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
  is the number of data and instruction blocks in use, and 𝑀𝑀
𝐵𝐵𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠∙
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
 
is the number of counter blocks in use. Putting the numbers in the above term we get 
~16% of memory overhead for the encryption counters and BMT.  
Hardware additions to the CPU, including extension for parallel execution (Chapter 3): 
an extra set of registers used for fast mode switching, ~0.5kB (24k gates). Each cache 
block requires extra metadata bits for Secure Access; assuming 64 Bytes per cache block 
and 10 bits for metadata, this yields in a <2% of cache size overhead. An SMU table 
entry is 32 Bytes, so a 3.2kB RAM suffices for 100 concurrent secure applications 
(equivalent to 25.6k gates [12]).  
For SDSM: 10 outstanding inactive TSCs, each 350 Bytes (similar to a thread control 
block), result in a 3.5kB RAM (28k gates). SDSM uses 10 cache entries for outstanding 
encryption pads (each 240 Bytes), which requires 2.4kB RAM (19.2k gates). 
The only non-negligible cryptographic cores are two AES-256 cores (used for both 
memory encryption and SDSM) and one RSA core. Implementations using 51.2k gates 
for AES-256 [8] and 2.6k for RSA [9] have been reported. AES area can be reduced by 
using AES-128, which was shown to be completely safe [17]. AES-128 core’s latency is 
half that of AES-256, so only 1 core is needed (time-shared). An AES-128 core's area is 
also about half, yielding a 4X area reduction in total AES core area.  
The overall estimated area overhead is under 150k gates. With 1.3B transistors for a 
modern PC CPU [67], and an average of 4 transistors per gate, SeM’s area overhead is less 
than 0.02% of a PC’s CPU, and much smaller of a server’s. 
Power consumption. Most of SeM's additional power consumption is for the 
encryption/decryption. [8] reports 76.8nJ for 256 Byte AES-128 encryption (130nm), and 
[9] reports 454µJ for RSA decryption (130nm). RSA decryption is only needed once per 
secure application execution and is thus negligible; AES encryption occurs only upon a 
secure application’s cache miss, so additional power consumption is small. Also, future 
crypto cores will require even less energy. 
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6 Conclusions 
The Secure Machine (SeM) is an extended CPU architecture that uses a novel hardware 
based security management unit (SMU) and a software tool, enables running a program 
securely even on a platform with unchanged and untrusted OS, Hypervisor, VMM, and 
hardware other than the CPU chip. Existing binaries are automatically instrumented to 
run on SeM as part of the submission to the secure cloud, requiring no programming 
efforts. SeM-Prepare does this by analyzing the binaries, statically linking external 
libraries, and adding wrapper functions for memory allocation and required system calls, 
and finally encrypting and signing. This essentially allows running any application (new or 
existing) on SeM. 
SeM reduces performance by at most 2% relative to no security at all, and 95% of the 
reduction stems from memory encryption and authentication, which are not unique to 
SeM. 
In the next chapter, we take the next stop, extending the basic SeM architecture to permit 
parallel workloads (multi-thread, -core and -computer). 
  
 
41 
 
Chapter 3 Parallel and Distributed 
Secure Execution  
1 Introduction 
The Secure Machine (SeM) provides basic secure processor services with untrusted and 
unmodified OS, hypervisor, and VMM: securely maintaining secret keys, memory 
encryption and integrity preservation, fast switching between Trusted and Untrusted 
execution modes (protecting data in the process), enforcing the correct flow of a secure 
program, and access control to cached (cleartext) data. However, SeM's program flow 
enforcement mechanism prevents the OS from creating new or alternative flows of 
execution, which does not allow creating new threads. 
In this chapter we extend SeM’s capabilities to multi-threaded programs that run on 
single core CPUs, CMPs, multi-CPU, and multi-computer systems, and even secure 
accelerators. For convenience, throughout this chapter we refer to these extensions and 
to the resulting CPU architecture as ParSeM. ParSeM supports both single- and multi-
threaded secure programs, and features secure process and thread migration. All this 
while supporting existing binaries, without restricting the OS, and only adding one 
instruction to it. ParSeM supports most existing application binaries (languages, 
programming methodologies, etc.); details in Chapter 4.   
We designed and implemented SeM-Prepare, a tool running on the user's trusted 
computer for preparing existing binaries for ParSeM (running offline or in the course of 
program submission to the cloud, sometimes referred to as application deployment). 
Then, we run SeM-Prepare on the PARSEC benchmark suite [48] binaries to make them 
SeM-Ready. We designed and implemented SeM-Simulator to execute the resulting 
binaries, thereby demonstrating completeness and correct results, and showing 
overheads to be negligible. These tools are described in detail in Chapters 5 and Appendix 
A, respectively.  
A multi-threaded program that uses use-level threads creates its own threads and 
manages them, thus appearing single-threaded to both the underlying OS and the 
hardware, so it can run securely even on SeM. However, only kernel-level threads may 
benefit from hardware parallelism (multi-core, multi-CPU or multi-machine), so ParSeM 
must address them. 
Support of multi-threaded applications raises several challenges: 1) thread creation, 
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migration, and termination normally require the services of the underlying OS, yet it is 
untrusted; 2) ensuring a shared address space for all threads, even though the untrusted 
OS controls the virtual memory system, and the memory space may span across many 
compute nodes connected via an untrusted medium.  
Overshadow [2] addressed thread creation and termination assuming that the VMM is 
trusted. A dedicated (trusted) VMM was suggested, running shim functions to mediate 
between the trusted program and the untrusted OS. Thread migration was not supported. 
However, when all platform software is untrusted, new challenges arise; e.g., similar 
functions cannot be used to guard the creation of a new thread on the secure program’s 
behalf (even if embedded into the secure program), since these must be privileged to 
access certain registers (e.g. the page table pointer). Another important work, Intel's SGX 
[22], which does not trust any platform software, does not support conventional 
threading. (See Chapter 1 for a detailed discussion of related work.)  
Supporting multi-node (and even multi-chip) computation moreover motivates the 
ability to run a program securely on heterogeneous platforms, which contain accelerators 
(GPUs, Smart NICs, FPGA, etc.).  
To enforce correct invocation of parallel programs, ParSeM provides hardware-assisted 
secure thread creation, migration, and termination, by extending the ISA with instructions 
that are executed by ParSeM’s hardware security management unit (see Appendix B for 
a detailed list of instructions). These ensure that privileged operations cause no harm, 
and can be trustfully executed by the secure program. Furthermore, we support 
heterogeneous systems whose accelerators meet a small set of requirements that we 
define. 
For securely fetching missing memory blocks from other trusted nodes, ParSeM uses a 
secure distributed shared memory layer (SDSM) connected through an untrusted 
medium, that uses address independent encryption for the transport only (unlike 
ParSeM) (Chapter 6). In SDSM, the directory must be trusted. The directory may be 
implemented in hardware or software; it may attest its authenticity or be provided as a 
trusted user program (protected by SeM). We also assume a distributed integrity-
preserving layer for maintaining the memory integrity of a distributed program (Chapter 
7).  
2 The ParSeM Architecture 
ParSeM uses the secure single-thread execution and setup capabilities of SeM, i.e. each 
CPU of ParSeM has an embedded SMU that protects its private Trusted Area (TA) via 
Secure Access and mode changes. A CMP has multiple cores on the same trusted chip, so 
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CMP internal core-to-core communication is done in the clear; therefore, the SMU’s 
encryption and decryption functions are carried out between the CMP’s last level cache 
(LLC) and the memory interface. The same SMU table is accessible by all the CMP’s cores 
(Figure 5).  
 
To establish a distributed Trusted Area (TA), i.e., a set of TAs in which each participating 
SMU stores the secret configurations of the secure (distributed) programs and their 
runtime state, we add secure SMU-to-SMU communication.  
To support multithreaded secure programs, we add thread creation and migration SMU 
instructions, and extend the SMU to support per-thread (instead of per-program) secret 
context eviction and restoration. All the SMU instructions (CPU ISA extensions) are 
performed by the trusted CPU using dedicated hardware and/or assisted by trusted and 
atomic CPU microcode.  
Preparing a program for ParSeM is similar to preparing a program for SeM: shared library 
functions are embedded (statically linked) into the binary, some additional instructions 
are instrumented into it, and then finally it is encrypted and signed. Chapter 5 discusses 
that in further detail. 
A parallel program begins as a single-threaded process running on one of the cores. 
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Figure 5: SeM hardware block diagram 
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Then, additional threads are created, either by the main thread or by sibling threads. 
These threads may run on the same core/CPU or may be migrated to a different one. 
Eventually only the first thread is expected to remain, and it terminates the program. This 
raises several challenges: ensuring that new threads are created correctly; ensuring that 
all the threads share the same memory address space; creating a distributed TA securely; 
safe thread migration; and maintaining the integrity of a distributed program. Also, 
enabling the use of a distributed TA on execution platforms such as accelerators (GPUs, 
Smart NICs, etc.). We next address these challenges: in Sec. 2.1 we discuss multi-threading 
in a single core, and then extend that to multi-core and multi-machine settings. 
2.1 Secure Thread Creation and Execution 
A new thread shares the process ID and address space with its parent thread, as do 
sibling threads, so the SMU will serve its memory access requests without further 
changes. If the OS initiates a new thread with the wrong process ID, then upon the first 
memory access of the new thread (its first attempt to read or modify the program’s 
memory) an owner-ID mismatch will occur (for Secure Access), which will cause a 
detected error. Each thread has a unique register set and stack; a new thread is launched 
with the register values of its creator (mostly), and with empty secure and non-secure 
stacks.  
Thread creation is initiated by secure code (of the parent thread) that belongs to the 
secure program, which normally calls a shared library function (e.g., pthread_create()). 
Being a shared library function, it is embedded in the binary during its preparation for 
ParSeM. Regardless of the thread creation method, the clone system call is eventually 
used (on Linux, or an alternative on other OS); it receives an argument of flags and a 
pointer to the new stack; the stack is assumed to be allocated by the code prior to the 
system call invocation, and it will be used as the non-secure stack for the new thread. 
Since the system call's code is untrusted (untrusted OS), this results in an automatic mode 
change to untrusted, as part of which the SMU stores the register values (and clears the 
registers) and the LEP into the SMU sealed storage. However, unlike a single-threaded 
program that leaves Trusted mode, here both the original and the new thread will return 
from the clone system call to the same LEP, differing from one another only in the stack 
pointer and the return value. From here on, the parent thread will continue; the new 
thread will allocate its secure stack, and will jump to its starting point.  
Creating a new thread requires an SMU instruction, SMU_NewThread(), for creating a 
new inactive thread secret context (TSC) containing the parent’s register values (except 
for the return value register, which is not restored), and the LEP is set as the address of 
the instruction following the syscall instruction (SMU_syscall (argnum)). (The actual offset 
may be configured beforehand per compiler.) SMU_NewThread is instrumented into the 
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binary just before the clone system call, and it returns the ID of the created TSC (SCID). 
The TSC does not leave the SMU until it is attached to the new thread. 
When clone returns, its return value is checked. If this is the new thread (TID>0), a secure 
stack is allocated and initialized, and the thread’s function address is pushed into it; clone 
normally performs this push, but being untrusted it cannot manipulate the secure stack. 
If clone fails (either for legitimate reasons or due to an attack), the new inactive secret 
context will be deleted using SMU_NewThreadDelete(SCID), which is instrumented into 
the binary as conditional code just after the call to clone. Pseudocode 4 shows the 
pseudocode and (automatic) additions for the original invocation of clone.  
SMU_NewThread() and SMU_NewThreadDelete() must be authentic to run, and a 
program may only initiate or delete a new TSC for its own PID, so a malicious program 
(even if privileged) may not initiate new secure threads.  
Finally, when the new thread is set to run, the OS (untrusted code) calls 
SMU_NewThreadAttach(TID, addr), which attaches the new thread ID with the inactive 
TSC (at address=addr), so it will serve to keep this thread’s consistency for the rest of its 
 
… 
new_stack=malloc(…) // non secure stack 
… 
SCID=SMU_NewThread() 
clone(flags, new_stack ) 
if (rax>0) // clone return value – new thread only 
     rsp = malloc(..)  // secure stack, including secure init 
     push(thread_func_addr) // normally done by clone 
else if (rax<0) // clone return value - failure 
  SMU_NewThreadDelete(SCID) 
… 
Pseudocode 4: Additional code inserted before and after the clone system call. New 
code is in grey background 
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execution. Pseudocode 5 shows the functionality of the new SMU instructions. 
If the OS fails to call SMU_NewThreadAttach() for the new thread, the thread will use a 
NULL TSC, which will fail verification due to an illegal entry point. If the OS calls 
SMU_NewThreadAttach() for an already existing thread, it will fail for an illegal entry 
point. If the OS also sets the existing thread’s entry point to match the expected LEP, then 
the new thread will run instead of the already running thread, which is merely a denial of 
service to the already running thread, therefore outside of our scope. Further OS attacks 
on ParSeM’s threading mechanism are discussed in Section 2.3. 
Remark. Since ParSeM does not protect against denial-of-service, we do not enforce 
fairness in scheduling; if fairness is important, it may be checked for using other measures, 
 
SMU_NewThread() 
   SC=New(SMU.SealedStorage.SecretContext)  
   Store registers into SC  
   SC.LEP = SMU_NewThread.rip+offset  // offset is the size of    
                                 //  SMU_NewThread + syscall instructions 
   SC.ParentTID = TID 
   Return SC.ID 
SMU_NewThreadDelete(SCID) 
   SC=SMU.SealedStorage.FindInactivePTID(SCID) 
    If (SC) // if found inactive context for this LEP 
 Delete(SC) 
    else 
       Report and error and halt 
SMU_NewThreadAttach(TID, addr) 
   SC=SMU.SealedStorage.FindInactiveTSC(addr) 
   If (SC) // if found inactive context for this LEP 
        SC.TID=TID 
        SC.SetActive(); 
   else  
        Report error and halt 
SMU_ThreadDelete(TID) 
    DeleteTSC(TID) 
Pseudocode 5: SMU thread creation and termination instructions, performed by the 
SMU 
 
 
 
47 
 
e.g. using barriers to make sure that all the threads have reached specific points of 
execution. 
Note that there is no temporal order guarantee for attaching new threads with inactive 
contexts. Multiple threads may be created by different parents, and may be attached to 
their context and set to run in any order; however, a new thread will be attached to its 
correct context and will run from an LEP.  
When a thread finishes (using any threading method), it eventually invokes the exit 
system call. To discard the thread’s TSC, we add SMU_ThreadDelete(TID) just before its 
invocation, and then exit discards the thread by the OS (as in untrusted threads). If the 
OS wrongfully attempts to resume the thread, it will attempt to execute without a TSC 
(when scheduled), and the SMU will declare failure upon scheduling.  
Threads can also die for other reasons, such as by receiving a KILL signal, or for dividing 
by zero. In that case, the entire process dies and the OS merely needs to clean after the 
secure program, both for its active and inactive threads. The SMU thread deletion 
instructions do not require to be authenticated to run, so the untrusted OS may perform 
these operations. 
When a node dies, no cleanup is needed. Furthermore, maintaining threads in an 
environment where nodes may crash is managed directly by the secure program, and it  
is orthogonal to the added security of ParSeM. 
A thread’s secure execution is preserved similarly to the single-threaded SeM: memory 
secrecy and integrity are kept as before; suspension and resumption of a thread’s 
execution are done via a context switch, but with the protection of per-thread (instead of 
per-process) context. (A secure memory region is allocated at the beginning of the 
program for TSC storage.)  
Shared address space is ensured by the same mechanism that ensures integrity of a 
single thread’s memory access: blocks being evicted from the TA are signed and 
encrypted, and the encryption counter is assigned per virtual address, so fetching the 
wrong block into the TA (or serving two threads with different page mappings) causes a 
detected MAC integrity error.  
2.2 Secure Process and Thread Migration 
Migration is the core of distributed multi-threading. Although process and thread 
migrations are initiated by untrusted entities (such as the OS), they should not expose 
secret information; the only damage potential is denial of service, which is unavoidable 
with an untrusted OS controlling the scheduler.  
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Secure thread migration between cores of the same CMP does not require any special 
treatment, as the same SMU (with its SMU table entries) serves them all. Counter and 
DBMT data are fetched between the CMP cores via the in-chip cache coherence 
mechanism, which is trusted. Migration of non-secure processes and threads between 
CPUs does not require special treatment. The challenge is thus inter-CPU migration of 
secure threads and processes. 
To allow secure thread migration between CPUs, an SMU table entry must be securely 
moved between SMUs, and sometimes securely duplicated, along with the thread's TSC.  
We require secure direct communication between SMUs. Prior knowledge is assumed 
to exist inside the SMU for providing identity authentication of other SMUs, so each SMU 
must store the trusted ParSeM authentication keys in a protected non-volatile memory. 
These keys may be updated using a rare update procedure signed by the SMU’s vendor. 
The update mechanism allows secure SMU-to-SMU communication between different 
generations of SMUs, or even across CPU vendors. (Cross vendor secure communication 
is also used in secure accelerators, Sec. 2.4.)  
The Flow of Migration 
Thread migration is initiated by an untrusted entity such as a load balancer, which 
instructs an untrusted local privileged agent to perform the actual migration. Then, the 
source SMU establishes a secure channel to the target SMU to verify its authenticity and 
exchange symmetric keys for encryption and authentication, like the creation of an SMU 
table entry in SeM. 
We distinguish between migrating an SMU table entry of a non-running secure process 
(before being invoked or after finishing) and migrating a thread of an already running 
secure process; within the latter, we act differently for a non-active thread (has not yet 
started its execution) and an active one. 
SMU table entry migration (for a non-running process) is done by 
SMU_MigrateEntry(Phash, Target) instruction (invoked by untrusted code), with the 
process hash and target CPU (machine) as parameters. After the source SMU establishes 
a secure channel with the target SMU, it sends the SMU table entry (encrypted and 
signed) to the target, which creates a new local SMU table entry (Pseudocode 6). For the 
target SMU, this is similar to creating a table entry for a new secure program. When done, 
the source SMU discards its table entry. Finally, the local untrusted agent moves the 
secure program to the target machine using simple (already encrypted) file copy. 
Migrating a thread of a running process requires a different approach: its data should be 
moved using its shared address space (without harming the existing threads). Migration 
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is initiated by the SMU_MigrateThread(PID, TID, addr, Target) instruction (invoked by 
untrusted code, and only performed when the thread is suspended), with parameters: 
process ID, thread ID (for an active thread), thread entry point (for a non-active thread), 
and the target CPU (machine). This is an SMU instruction, executed by the source SMU. 
First, it opens a secure channel to the target SMU. It then sends the (encrypted and 
signed) SMU table entry to the target. If the thread has yet to start running, the source 
sends the new inactive TSC encrypted and signed (using keys exchanged between the 
SMUs), and discards it locally. If it has started, its secret context is available in the process’ 
shared address space when suspended, so it will be migrated by SDSM. See Pseudocode 
6 for migration instructions. 
The target SMU creates a new SMU table entry unless one with the same PID and keys 
already exists (because another same-process thread is already running there). The DBMT 
root hash is not sent as part of the SMU table entry, as no counter-protected data is being 
moved. Finally, the thread executes as usual on the target machine, causing the memory 
system to fetch all the required data and instructions using the shared address space over 
SDSM. 
The SMU table entry is sent through an untrusted medium. An attacker that tries to 
modify it while being sent will fail the signature validation at the receiver, causing the 
SMU to halt the secure program and report an error.  
 
SMU_MigrateEntry(Phash, Target) 
    {EncKey,SigKey}=SMU_SecureChannel(Target) 
    Send EncAndSign(SMU_Entry(Phash), 
                          EncKey,SigKey) to Target 
    Discard SMU_Entry(Phash) 
SMU_MigrateThread(PID, TID, Faddr, Target) 
    {EncKey,SigKey}=SMU_SecureChannel(Target) 
    // without the root hash 
    Send EncAndSign(SMU_Entry(PID), 
                      EncKey,SigKey) to Target 
    If (!TID) 
        SC=SMU.SealedStorage.FindInactiveLEP(Faddr) 
         If (SC) // if found inactive context for this LEP 
              Send EncAndSign(SC,EncKey,SigKey) to Target 
Pseudocode 6: SMU thread migration instructions, performed by the SMU 
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Even when no active threads remain in the source SMU, this table entry must be kept 
for future evictions of data that still resides in its cache and for data blocks that are 
currently owned by this CPU. It may only be discarded when no thread or data of the 
secure program remain in this CPU. 
Cloud Applicability. Cloud services normally have gateway computers that accept new job 
submissions and direct them to target machine(s). Migrating an SMU table entry is useful 
for initiating a new secure program’s SMU table entry on the gateway computer without 
running it, and then the gateway’s SMU may trustfully migrate the secure program’s SMU 
table entry to execute elsewhere. The gateway’s SMU acts as a trusted key vault that may 
pass its knowledge to a target SMU, as long as the target SMU’s vendor is trusted by the 
source SMU’s vendor. When finished, the SMU entry may be migrated back to a gateway 
computer, so the status result is collected by the user.  
 
2.3 Security Evaluation of ParSeM 
We now discuss several attacks on ParSeM that are related to its beyond-SeM features.  
Malicious thread creation. Here, OS privileged code creates extra threads in order to 
cause incorrect execution of the program. When a thread is set to run, the SMU 
automatically loads its TSC from memory. Each thread has its own TSC, protected by the 
memory encryption subsystem, so duplicating memory blocks will cause a detected error 
when fetched.  
Another flavor of this attack entails duplicating the TSC to the same virtual address on a 
different machine, so different page tables are used. When the duplicated TSC is fetched 
into the cache for running the duplicated thread, there is no private counter associated 
with this TSC on this machine, so decryption will fail. When trying to also duplicate the 
associated counter, the DBMT will detect a counter integrity error because this counter 
is not supported by the current DBMT on the duplicate machine. 
Modify the start point or argument of a new thread. A new thread is maliciously started 
from an arbitrary address, instead of the instruction following the clone call; however, 
running the thread's secure code requires its TSC that enforces the next instruction to be 
an LEP, or else switching to Trusted mode will fail, the program will be halted and an error 
will be reported. Also, modifying the thread’s arguments requires either modifying data 
in the secure memory (protected by memory encryption), or invoking the thread through 
a different trace than intended (and manipulate the registers meanwhile), which is 
protected by the LEP upon switching to Trusted mode. 
Erroneous return value to the clone() system call. Since our clone() wrapper code uses 
the clone’s return value to determine its operations, we must consider wrong return value 
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by the clone system call.  
Case 1: clone failed, but the return value is success, so a pending thread context stays 
available. This is essentially a denial of service attack, since the program expects a new 
thread to run, but it will never do so. If a future clone will use the long-waiting pending 
thread context, then the denial of service has finally ended and we simply 'shift' the denial 
of service to the newer thread. Because this attack must cause at least one thread to 
suffer from an infinite denial of service, it is outside the scope of this work. (It should 
nonetheless be noted that security is not compromised.) 
Case 2: clone succeeded, but the return value is fail.  This causes a race condition with 
two possible cases: 
a) The new thread is attached to its pending context after the secure program has 
deleted the pending context. In that case an error is most likely to occur, since the 
pending context has been deleted. It will not occur if a new thread was set to run 
meanwhile (using the same address), so the error is simply shifted to the last thread in 
such a sequence of events.  
b) The new thread is attached to its pending context before deletion. In that case the 
thread is ready to run (and may already start running). However, the creating thread calls 
SMU_NewThreadDelete() to delete the inactive context. In the discussed case this context 
is no longer inactive, so SMU_NewThreadDelete() will declare an error and the program 
will be halted. 
Unshared address space. Here, different address spaces are presented to two same-
process threads, so when accessing the same address they will read different values. If 
the threads run on the same CPU, cache coherence protects the data internally, so this 
must be done by manipulating evicted memory blocks. The counter and DBMT are 
updated on every eviction, and counters are validated when being fetched back into the 
TA, regardless of the last writer, so the most recent value must be fetched on the next 
read, or else an error will be detected. 
If the threads are running on different CPUs, then although memory blocks may reside 
in more than one CPU, they must be unmodified. Modifying a block causes SDSM to 
invalidate all its other copies. Also, fetching a missing block from another machine is 
validated by SDSM. Undetected violation of the same-process address spaces is thus 
impossible. 
2.4 Secure Accelerators 
Heterogeneous systems often comprise accelerators alongside CPUs [46]. Being 
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architecture agnostic, ParSeM’s approach is also applicable to accelerators. Unlike CPU 
cores, accelerators normally do not have their own OS; they run parts of the program, 
and oftentimes of multiple programs concurrently. They normally comprise a 
management entity, execution elements, and on-board memories (sometimes shared 
with the CPU), and normally use isolated memory regions rather than the process’ 
address space.  
We define the trusted area as the accelerator chip. We require an SMU in the secure 
accelerator chip for establishing a secure communication channel with other SMUs (or 
users), and to store secret keys. The SMU uses these keys for encrypting and decrypting 
the memory content of the related job when entering and exiting the accelerator chip, 
such that no data enters or leaves it chip without the SMU's supervision. 
Since accelerators do not run an OS, there is no privileged code that may interfere with 
the secure job. We assume that the trusted accelerator chip is correct and performs its 
operation trustfully. A key requirement for an accelerator that runs one job at a time is to 
clear the previous job's traces in between jobs. If running multiple jobs simultaneously, 
another key requirement is that the accelerator must enforce complete separation 
among different jobs. The SMU is used for identifying the jobs and job replacement time 
and it produces a wipe signal when required, but the accelerator's internals must be 
modified to accept such signal and work accordingly.  
To our knowledge, a critical obstacle in the way of such a solution is that the 
management of many accelerators still heavily depends on the CPU. If this CPU is 
untrusted, then it may damage our security assumption on the accelerator. However, 
having a small CPU as part of the accelerator (e.g., in the same chip) just to perform the 
controlling operations may solve this issue. This small embedded CPU should have SMU 
capabilities, and it merely acts as another trusted node. In view of the strength and area 
of accelerators, and the fact that only little is required from this CPU (controller), adding 
it is actually a simple and effective solution.  
Consider, for example, GPUs and Smart NICs. They run programs that access local 
untrusted memory, portions of which may be cached internally. The program must be 
protected using conventional memory encryption, performed by the SMU. The data may 
belong to the program itself, so the internal unencrypted memory content is protected 
by the SMU using Secure Access. Alternatively, the data may consist of a stream that 
comes from the untrusted world (e.g. the network, or a sensor), so the actual program 
must be prepared for the ParSeM accelerator using unprotected memory access (see 
Appendix B for instructions). In any case, the registers used for computation are cleared 
between different jobs.  
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Another example is FPGAs, which are commonly used for pipelined calculations. The 
FPGA configuration program is signed (and optionally encrypted), so it must be validated 
correctly by the SMU to be applied to the FPGA. This also triggers a wiping process for all 
the internal registers and memories. For calculations over protected data only, the stream 
of data must be validated by the SMU when entering the chip; this can be done by 
assigning continuous addresses to the data stream. Calculation over unprotected data is 
possible if stated so by the image, which causes the SMU to bypass its security checks 
during runtime.  
A new job is sent to the accelerator with a randomly chosen encryption key (using the 
secure link between SMUs), and the memory image is encrypted with this key using 
counter mode with zeroed initial seeds, alongside an integrity signature (if required). The 
accelerator's SMU then creates a local tree for integrity tracking, verifies the signature, 
and zero-initializes a local seed structure. When done, it saves the results signed and 
encrypted in memory. Besides the aforementioned cleaning, the accelerator internals and 
normal operation remain unchanged, so we do not impose any requirement on the 
accelerator's programs. Furthermore, existing accelerator programs (binaries) are also 
supported, where even instrumentation is not required (unlike programs for ParSeM 
CPU). The only addition required is security attributes (discussed above), which reside in 
the program metadata.  
Preparing a program to run on ParSeM with compatible accelerators requires calling a 
shim for the accelerator management functions for code insertion. This code opens a 
secure channel with the accelerator’s SMU, signs and encrypts a package for the 
accelerator, and finally accepts the protected results from it. This shim must be tailored 
per accelerator, presumably by the accelerator’s manufacturer. Since the accelerator’s 
internal operation is unaltered, and the added protection only acts as a gateway for 
encrypted data and internal separation of unrelated jobs, ParSeM's secure accelerator 
method is applicable to many types of accelerators. Also, because most of the overheads 
occur between jobs, we do not expect a significant implication on the actual job's 
performance, so a quantitative evaluation is left as future work.  
3 Performance Evaluation 
We extended SeM-Prepare and SeM-Simulator to support the instructions and added for 
ParSeM, and these are described in detail in Chapter 5 and Appendix A, respectively. Since 
running parallel workloads on distributed settings assumes the existence of SDSM and 
DBMT, the performance results take into account the overheads caused by those as well. 
ParSeM's overhead is in the program’s memory allocations (for secure initializations) 
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and access (encryption), its use of file access functions (for cryptography), and its mode 
changes. All these have a negligible effect on performance-critical elements such as the 
cache and branch prediction, and none on execution units. 
SeM-Simulator allows running long programs (>1012 instructions), yielding statistically 
significant results. We instrumented the PARSEC benchmark suite [48] using the SeM-
Prepare tool, and then ran it with its biggest dataset (native) on SeM-Simulator, with 
many (32, 64, 128, 256) threads, each runs on a single-threaded node. (facesim and 
blackscholes do not scale to 256 threads.) All programs successfully spawned threads, 
changed modes, invoked system calls, used files, and allocated secure memory.  
Figure 6 shows the performance loss relative to no security at all (running the 
benchmarks unchanged) with and without memory encryption, including SDSM's 
overhead. The mean performance penalty is 2.2% - 3.1% (for 32 - 256 threads), of which 
1.5% - 2.3% is caused by memory encryption and merely 0.8% by ParSeM itself. 
Performance reduction for the PARSEC dedup program is much higher than the rest, and 
without it the mean reduction drops to 2.0-2.7% with memory encryption and 0.17-0.18% 
without. Given such a low penalty, no other solution (past or future) can do much better. 
Table 2 shows the number of thread creations by various PARSEC benchmarks during 
their entire run time for various numbers of nodes, as well as the normalized mode-switch 
counts (per 1k instructions). From Figure 6 that depicts performance in conjunction with 
  
 
Figure 6: ParSeM performance overheads vs. node count, running PARSEC 
benchmark suite 
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Table 2, it is clearly evident that mode changes have only a negligible implication on the 
actual performance; the overhead caused by thread creations is negligible, since these 
are infrequent relative to total amount of work. Figure 7 shows memory allocations and 
I/O accesses normalized to the number of instructions, for the various benchmarks. Both 
are clearly correlated with ParSeM's performance reduction, and our tests show that 
software encryption for I/O is at the core of this reduction. E.g., dedup requires an order 
of magnitude more I/O accesses and memory allocations, causing a 2-3X bigger 
performance reduction than the rest. This may be sharply mitigated by hardware support 
for secure I/O. 
 
ParSeM was not measured against prior art because no prior art supports distributed 
parallel execution; moreover, with ParSeM’s minor performance reduction and negligible 
overheads, none can do noticeably better on common features. 
 
 
 32 Nodes 64 Nodes 128 Nodes 256 Nodes 
Benchmark Thread 
Creations 
Mode 
Switches 
(per 1k 
instr.) 
Thread 
Creations 
Mode 
Switches 
(per 1k 
instr.) 
Thread 
Creations 
Mode 
Switches 
(per 1k 
instr.) 
Thread 
Creations 
Mode 
Switches 
(per 1k 
instr.) 
blackscholes 32 9.581 64 10.907 128 7.543 --- --- 
bodytrack 33 1.3 65 1.385 128 0.953 257 1.013 
canneal 32 8.512 64 9.572 128 7.094 256 7.934 
dedup 98 1.091 194 1.357 386 0.697 770 0.75 
facesim 31 3.009 63 2.56 127 2.014 --- --- 
ferret 130 2.168 258 1.947 514 2.157 1026 1.808 
fluidanimate 32 8.712 64 9.558 128 10.788 256 10.306 
rtview 32 0.337 64 0.339 128 0.333 256 0.33 
streamcluster 192 0.323 384 0.691 768 1.973 1536 4.674 
 
Table 2: Statistics of events that occurred during PARSEC execution on ParSeM for 32, 64, 128, 
and 256 compute nodes settings. 
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4 Conclusions 
ParSeM is a hardware based solution that protects against software and off-chip 
hardware attacks, including a hostile OS, hypervisor and provider. It can protect at process 
granularity, and allows secure programs to use unlimited, dynamically allocated memory. 
By adding hardware assisted thread creation, termination, and migration, it enhances 
SeM to fully support parallel programs on single core CPUs, CMPs, and distributed 
platforms (including dynamic thread migration). Additionally, ParSeM supports 
heterogeneous systems with secure accelerators that support a small set of 
requirements. 
Existing program binaries are automatically instrumented on a trusted computer by 
SeM-Prepare, simply replacing syscall instructions and embedding trusted shims, shared 
libraries are embedded, and then encrypting and signing the ParSeM-ready binary. This 
allows running existing program binaries securely. Lastly, only one instruction is added to 
the untrusted OS.  
ParSeM degrades performance by < 3% relative to no security. Moreover, in most cases, 
95% of this is due to memory encryption and authentication; in I/O intensive programs, 
  
 
Figure 7: PARSEC benchmark suite I/O and memory allocations 
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much of the degradation is due to software assisted encryption, and may be sharply 
mitigated using hardware. 
Jointly providing security, performance, backward compatibility, and furthermore 
supporting parallel and distributed programs and even accelerators, ParSeM thus 
constitutes a major step towards convenient and efficient secure computing on untrusted 
platforms, including public cloud systems. Topics for further study include hardware 
support for secure I/O, further study of the use of secure accelerators, direct support for 
scripting and bytecode supported languages, and using RDMA with ParSeM. 
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Chapter 4 Supporting Programming 
Models and Shared Libraries 
1 Scope of Support 
SeM support existing binaries with some limitations. Embedding all shared library 
functions into the binary, we assume that calling untrusted code intentionally is only done 
by system calls. Indirect calls must only aim at locations within the same parts of the code 
(trusted indirect calls to trusted code, and untrusted indirect calls to untrusted code), or 
else arguments will not be passed. This may limit dynamically loaded libraries. 
Programs that use the mmap() system call are currently not supported, because mmap() 
uses a memory region that is accessed both by the untrusted OS and by the application. 
This prevents a secure initialization as done for secure memory regions, so SeM cannot 
use that securely.  
 Nonetheless, running the PARSEC benchmark suite correctly (including C and C++ 
parallel workloads from various fields), and also other workloads such as AI, compiling 
and interpretation, and video and data compression, suggests that this limitation may not 
be severe. 
SeM assumes a multi-threaded system with distributed shared memory, though 
programming for message passing interface (MPI) [53] is possible by running many single-
threaded instances of the secure program, which are also supported in the basic single-
thread single-core solution. 
Since SeM target accepting program binaries, using languages such as Java or server side 
scripting languages requires preparation of the runtime environment for SeM in order to 
ensure its confidential and unharmed execution, and the actual program is then run as its 
input. Direct support for such languages remains a topic for future work. 
Finally, the SeM benchmark results matched the results with unchanged binaries. This 
strongly indicates correctness, as well as the applicability of SeM to existing binaries. 
 
2 Shared Libraries 
Using shared libraries like libc [32] for execution is common. Thus far, preparing a binary 
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for SeM required the embedding of shared library functions (SLFs) into it. Besides the 
obvious drawbacks of larger binary and memory footprint for the secure process, this also 
grants the SLF's code access to the entire memory space of the secure program.  
Though accidental data leakage is prevented by SeM's security mechanisms, intentional 
code manipulation by a malicious shared library provider cannot be ruled out. Embedding 
SLFs into the binary ensures that the same SLF code executes on both the user's trusted 
computer and on SeM; however, the same code may behave differently in different 
environments (e.g., private computer vs. VM). On the other hand, SLFs that are not part 
of the secure binary may have been manipulated beforehand, and can return undesired 
results, which therefore must be actively checked by the secure program. A tradeoff 
between approaches. Therefore, we want to also allow the use SLFs that are not statically 
embedded into the secure binary, and it is critically important to ensure that these can 
only access their required data.  
We now present a new method that enables the use of untrusted SLFs by a secure 
program. We start by introducing new stack operations, and then dive into the details.  
2.1 Stack Operations 
A secure program uses a non-secure stack (NSS) for non-secure function calls that run 
from its context, and a secure stack (SS) that serves function calls within the secure code. 
Each is natively accessed (by push, pop, memory[rsp+offset], call, ret, etc.) as if it were the 
only stack.  
To use the NSS for communication between the secure and non-secure code, we add 
two SMU instructions that allow secure code to bypass the Secure Access mechanism: 
• SMU_PushNA – pushes data into the NSS, regardless of its Auth status, and sets its 
memory block’s Auth bit to False. 
• SMU_PopNA - pops data from the NSS, regardless of its memory block’s Auth status. 
 
These instructions use the non-secure stack pointer, and update it accordingly. They 
must be authentic to execute, and must therefore run in Trusted mode. 
2.2 Using Untrusted Shared Library Functions 
We wish to enable a user program provided as binaries to use shared library functions 
(SLFs) while running securely. These SLFs are not part of the secure program, so we do 
not enforce their correct execution. Also, we do not modify them. 
Each OS has a convention for passing arguments to and getting return values from 
functions. These conventions (e.g. System V AMD64 ABI [37], Microsoft x64 [38], IA-32 
fastcall [44]) address the number of arguments passed via registers, and which registers 
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to use. Passing of more arguments than the number of dedicated registers always uses 
the stack, and the function’s return address is pushed into the stack by the call instruction, 
so returning is simply done by ret. 
First Change to Trusted mode. With no embedded SLFs, the program initially runs 
untrusted code (e.g. libc functions) before calling main(); then, a trusted function is called 
by untrusted code and the secure phase of the program begins. When done, it returns to 
its caller, so the return address (originally stored in the NSS) must be available in the SS. 
Therefore, the first mode change to trusted for a call instruction (untrusted code calling 
a trusted function) should pop the return address from the NSS and push it into the SS 
instead. This allows a secure program to finish correctly in Untrusted mode.  
Inter-Mode Calls. Although the registers are automatically cleared when switching to 
Untrusted mode, some of them must sometimes remain untouched. For that, we add the 
SMU_CallNoSec(i) instruction, where i ranges from 1 to the maximum number of 
arguments passed via the registers in the chosen architecture (E.g., 6 in AMD64 ABI). This 
instruction is similar to call, with three minor differences: 1) (only) the first i register 
arguments will not be cleared in the next switch to Untrusted mode; 2) the return address 
is pushed into the NSS instead of the SS; and 3) the next switch to Trusted mode will not 
clear the register used as return value (rax in AMD64 ABI). 
Argument Passing. Consider code generated by a GCC compiler [45]. (Our methods are 
easily adaptable to binaries produced by other compilers.) When calling SLFs, GCC uses a 
dedicated per-SLF .plt function to locate the address of the requested SLF. When called 
for the first time, the .plt uses the dynamic loader to find the address of the SLF. Upon 
subsequent calls, it redirects the program directly to the SLF.      
Whenever an SLF is not part of the secure program, its code is non-authentic. Therefore, 
when called by the secure program, the SMU will change to Untrusted mode and will clear 
the value of the registers, making them unavailable to the SLF. Furthermore, arguments 
passed via the stack (using push instructions) are natively pushed into the SS, so these are 
also unavailable to the SLF. Therefore, transferring arguments to untrusted code requires 
special attention.  
Whenever an SLF's arguments can be passed via the registers, we simply replace the 
original call instruction to the .plt function with SMU_CallNoSec(i) to the same target 
(where i is chosen per SLF). This allows argument- and return-value passing via the 
registers, without revealing any additional data.   
For SLFs that require more arguments than the available argument registers, or if simple 
argument passing does not suffice (more later), we use automatically-created trusted 
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shims: we create a per-SLF trusted shim, and embed it in the secure program (must be 
encrypted). It uses SMU_PushNA to store the additional arguments into the NSS, and then 
calls the SLF's .plt function using SMU_CallNoSec(i) (where i is the maximum number of 
register arguments for the target architecture). Finally, a call to the SLF's shim replaces 
the original call. (Figure 8.a)  
When the original binary code invokes the SLF, it prepares its arguments according to 
the target OS’s convention (in registers and in the stack), so our approach simply bridges 
the security gap for the SLF. When the SLF finishes, it invokes ret, which returns to the 
trusted shim (if used) or to the original calling point. Using SMU_CallNoSec(i) ensures that 
the return address is available to the SLF, and that the return value is available to its caller. 
(Figure 8.b) 
Pseudocode 7 depicts the modifications to the original binary as well as implementation 
of the trusted shims, with the secure parts (encrypted) on a grey background. It targets 
the System V AMD64 ABI function calling convention, used in modern 64-bit Linux 
systems [10], and assumes integer arguments; implementing for floating point arguments 
is similar. 
The trusted shim is added automatically to the original binary on the user’s trusted 
computer. This is done by scanning the .plt section for per-SLF entries, analyzing the 
invoked SLFs (their binary, source code if available, or public documentation), and locating 
the SLF calls. The shims must match the number of arguments required for the SLF.  
Pointer arguments. The above approach is suitable for values passed directly between 
  
shmExF1:
Callnosec_n hlpExF1
.pltExF1:
ExF1:
Clear Encrypted
Callnosec_n .pltExF1
.pltExF1:
ExF1:
a b
SLF SLF
 
Figure 8: Program flow for a shared library function (SLF) that accepts arguments: 
a. by the registers only; b. by the registers and the stack. 
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secure and non-secure code. However, when pointers are passed, the actual data exists 
in the secure memory. Possible approaches to address this case: 
1. Embed SLFs that get pointers as parameters into the original binary, thereby making 
them part of the secure code. This should also be done recursively for SLFs that they 
call (with pointers). 
2. Copy the data to non-secure memory using a trusted shim. 
Both approaches assume prior knowledge of the type of the SLF’s arguments, so that 
appropriate decisions can be made. The complexity of the second approach is similar to 
the one used in complex system calls, discussed in Chapter 2. 
Additional code insertion. We support automatic insertion of additional code into the 
trusted shims for SLFs that require more than just argument passing. E.g., buffer copying 
from and to the secure memory, software protected I/O functions (including encryption 
and decryption), etc. It may also be used for secure thread creation (Chapter 3) instead 
of embedding the thread management SLFs, and for initialization of secure memory 
allocated by the secure code such that it is accessible by the secure program (due to 
Secure Access).  
This is also usable against Iago attacks. E.g., to protect against a malicious malloc() SLF 
that reassigns an already allocated memory region (causing the secure program to 
overwrite its own data), simple code is added to the memory allocation (and freeing) 
trusted shim for checking  the uniqueness of the allocated regions. 
Original binary: #secure 
# store argument #1-#6 into the registers 
   mov rdi, arg1 
 … 
   mov r9, arg6 
# store argument #7-#N into the SS 
   mov [rbp+..] arg7   
 … 
   mov [rbp+..] argN 
call .pltExF1 shmExF1 
shmExF1: #secure 
# put arguments in NSS 
  … 
  SMU_PushNA [rsp+(N-6)*4] #argN 
  … 
  SMU_PushNA [rsp+4] #arg7 
  SMU_CallNoSec(i) .pltExF1 
  ret 
 
.pltExF1: #non secure 
… 
 
 
Pseudocode 7: Using a trusted shim for argument passing (new code is 
underlined). Encrypted parts are with grey background 
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We designed and implemented a SeM-Prepare tool, which accepts the original binary and 
also code in C for additional code insertion, and compiles and embeds it into the desired 
location in the trusted shim.  
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Chapter 5 SeM-Prepare 
 
We implemented SeM Prepare, to prepare an existing binary for SeM (hence making it 
SeM-ready). To our knowledge, this tool makes SeM the only secure architecture that 
supports existing binaries, where the ones that come closer [43,49] only support 
unmodified source code, and thus require the program’s source code and recompilation. 
In this chapter we focus on the preparation (instrumentation). The SMU instructions for 
the setup and finish processes, to be used by an untrusted management program running 
on the untrusted machine, are listed in Appendix B.  
SeM Prepare is an automatic tool for converting previously-compiled Linux binaries (ELF) 
into SeM ready Linux binaries, and a similar tool can be used for any OS. We used GNU 
BinUtils [N] to encode and decode instructions, and ELFIO [N] to manipulate binaries, i.e. 
reading, generating, and instrumenting ELF files. New instructions were encoded using 
multi-byte NOP instructions.  
SeM Prepare adds two new sections to the binary: ‘nosec_init’ and ‘sec_init’.  nosec_init 
is set as the new entry point instead of main(). First, nosec_init connects the secure 
program with its already existing SMU entry by invoking SMU_SetPID(phash), where 
phash is either chosen by SeM Prepare or supplied by the user. (phash is the same value 
as in the SMU entry, and is not secret.) It then allocates memory for a secure stack and 
for the encryption counters and integrity tree metadata (Chapter 2), and calls sec_init that 
initializes the secure stack by SMU_InitA, updates the stack pointer, and calls main() (so 
the secure code begins). The address of sec_init is the First LEP in the SMU table entry. 
See Pseudocode 8 for the sequence of events.  
SeM-Prepare may either embed shared library functions into the secure binary, or it may 
use them as shared resources on the target machine. Each requires a different approach. 
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Embedding Shared Library Functions 
SeM-Prepare embeds shared functions into the binary, and then updates the target of 
call instructions with the new embedded location. Originally, a binary that uses shared 
functions invokes a helper function to locate the address of the shared function, using the 
dynamic loader. Considering binaries that were compiled using GCC, the .plt section 
contains the shared function locators (e.g. for “printf” shared function, the printf@plt is 
called by the program). These plt functions are not required anymore, and calls for those 
are simply replaced with a direct call to the embedded function. This must also be done 
recursively for the embedded functions themselves, since one shared function may call 
another. Additionally, shared functions may require shared functions from other libraries, 
so these should be embedded and redirected to as well. 
Then, SeM-Prepare looks for syscall instructions in order to identify the system call in use; 
this is done by locating an immediate assignment to eax just before the syscall instruction. 
SeM-Prepare then queries a directory of system calls (consisting of 314 system calls in 64-
bit Linux systems) to identify the number and type of arguments. It then replaces the 
syscall instruction with the SMU_syscall(argnum) instead. For system calls with pointer 
arguments, the syscall instruction is replaced with a call to a shim that copies the required 
data to the unprotected memory by using SMU_StoreNA instructions, and it then invokes 
the desired system call by SMU_syscall, with the pointer argument redirected to the 
unprotected copy. Additionally, some shims may perform encryption and decryption 
instead of simply copying the data to/from the unprotected memory, e.g. for file 
accessing system calls (sys_write or sys_read). New shims are put in a new section in the 
nosec_init: 
    SMU_SetPID(phash) 
    SecStackPointer=Malloc(stack_size) 
    EncCounters=Malloc(counters_size) 
    IntegrityTree=Malloc(integrity_size) 
    call sec_init 
sec_init: 
    SMU_InitA(SecStackPointer, stack_size) 
    SP=SecStackPointer 
    call main()  
….… // the original program 
Pseudocode 8: Initialization code added into the binary  
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binary that is called secure_shim.  
Being closely related with the thread creation and termination, the clone and exit system 
calls require special instrumentation to support secure hardware-assisted thread 
management. This is done by adding SMU_NewThread() just before the clone system call 
to create a pending context for the new thread (See Pseudocode 9), and 
SMU_ThreadDelete(TID) just before the exit system call to discard the thread’s secret 
context.  
A technical remark: adding and changing instructions in an already compiled binary is not 
an easy task. Data may be placed in the code section (and accessed by other instructions), 
and function pointers may be used. Because of these, we strive to edit the binary in place 
where instructions are not moved from their original location. 
A syscall instruction is 2 bytes long, where converting it to SMU_Syscall(argnum) requires 
additional bits for the argument. However, we observe that unused bits in the original 
binary may be used: an immediate value assignment to eax is 5 bytes, where many of 
these bytes are zero (since only 314  syscall types exist). We therefore use the MSB of the 
eax assignment to encode the argnum for the SMU_Syscall instruction, and SeM CPU 
should reduce its value back to zero for invoking the actual system call. There are cases in 
which eax is not assigned with an immediate value but it is assigned with a value from 
another register (e.g., r9d), a 3-byte instruction. In every case that we checked, the other 
register is assigned by an immediate value that is easily backtracked in the code, and it 
may be modified accordingly. 
… 
new_stack=malloc(…) // non secure stack 
… 
SCID=SMU_NewThread() 
clone(flags, new_stack ) 
if (rax>0) // return value 
     rsp = malloc(..)  // secure stack, including secure init 
    push(thread_func_addr) // normally done by clone 
else if (rax<0) // clone return value 
  SMU_NewThreadDelete(SCID) 
… 
 
Pseudocode 9: Additional code inserted before and after the clone system call. New 
code is in grey background. 
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For cases in which we are required to wrap the system call, we replace the syscall + eax 
assignment (5-7 bytes together) by a call to a new function that we embed in the ELF file 
(a call instruction is 5 bytes), that may perform additional code. When done, we simply 
ret to the original location.  
The suggested approach is of course a workaround for the commonly used x64 ISA, which 
allows implementation using current ISA and binaries. Future ISA may enable simpler 
modifications. 
Next, SeM-Prepare implants a shim for memory allocation functions (malloc / calloc), that 
initializes the allocated memory as part of the secure program’s code so it is accessible 
for the secure program (See Pseudocode 10). 
 
 
 
void* sem_malloc(size_t size)  
      void* retval;  
      retval = malloc(size); 
      if (retval) 
 InitA(retval, size); 
      return retval; 
 
Pseudocode 10:  sem_malloc() implementation 
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Non Embedded Shared Library Functions SeM-Prepare scans the binary for shared 
function calls; for GCC compiled binaries, the plt functions are found in the .plt section, 
and each plt function is responsible for a specific shared function. Since shared functions 
are publically known, we query a database of shared functions in order to identify the 
argument needs of each, similarly to the system call database. For shared functions that 
only require register arguments, each call directed to a plt function is replaced by a 
SMU_CallNoSec(i) instruction, where i is the number of register arguments used by this 
shared function. (See Pseudocode 11 for an example.)  
A technical remark: similarly to the issue of converting syscall instructions into 
SMU_syscall (argnum), we wish to convert call instructions into SMU_CallNoSec(i) 
without moving the original code. Since the .plt section always exists at the beginning of 
the address space of the file, these call instructions always use a negative offset to 
address the plt function. Additionally, since the binaries are of limited size (we checked 
binaries that are up to ~100MB), this offset commonly requires far fewer bits than it is 
addressed with. We therefore use the top 3 bits of the offset to encode the number of 
registers to be kept (i) on  SMU_CallNoSec(i) instructions.  
The suggested approach is of course a workaround that allows implementation using 
current ISA and binaries. Future ISA may enable simpler modifications. 
For shared functions that require more than the number of arguments that can be passed 
using the registers (>6 in System V AMD64 ABI), and for shared functions that take pointer 
arguments, we use a similar approach to the one used in embedded shared functions. A 
Original binary: #secure  
… 
# prepare arguments in registers     
mov rdi, arg1   
…     
mov r9, arg6  
call .pltExF1 
SMU_CallNoSec(6) .pltExF1 
 
.pltExF1: #non secure … 
… 
 
Pseudocode 11: Calling a shared function that only accepts register arguments. 
Encrypted parts are with grey background, and new code is underlined. 
 
 
 
69 
 
shim is automatically prepared and added into the binary, and the original call to the plt 
function is replaced by a call to the shim. It copies non-register arguments into the non-
secure stack using SMU_PushNA instructions (see Pseudocode 12 for an example); for 
pointer arguments, it copies the required memory content to the untrusted memory 
using SMU_StoreNA, and it then calls the original plt of the shared function.  
Remark: when not embedding shared functions, the secure hardware-assisted thread 
management instructions cannot be instrumented just before or after the threading 
system calls. To keep this approach simple, we always embed thread-managing shared 
functions.  
Additional Code Insertion: As discussed in Chapter 4, some non-embedded shared 
functions require more than just argument passing; e.g., memory copying to or from the 
unprotected memory space, encryption and decryption functions, etc.  We use the 
trusted shims for this purpose: SeM-Prepare accepts additional code in C, complies it, and 
Original binary: #secure  
… 
# prepare arguments in registers     
mov rdi, arg1   # pointer 
…     
mov r9, arg6 
push arg7 
call .pltExF1 
call .shimExF1 
… 
.shimExF1 
pop rcx 
SMU_PushNA rcx     # push the 7th argument into the non-secure stack 
SMU_CallNoSec(6) .pltExF1 
ret 
… 
.pltExF1: #non secure … 
… 
 
Pseudocode 12: Calling a shared function that accepts seven arguments, the first 
six are passed via the registers, and the seventh via the stack. Encrypted parts 
are with grey background, and new code is underlined. 
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implants calls to it from the shim functions before or after the actual plt function call. 
Such code is likely to be supplied with SeM-Prepare for commonly used shared libraries 
or by the shared library vendor, still keeping the flexibility of a power user to set an 
existing binary to match its security needs. 
Finally, the resulting binary is encrypted and signed, leaving the nosec_init and .plt 
unencrypted. The keys are either provided by the user or chosen randomly; these keys 
are crucial for the secrecy and integrity of the secure program.  
Remark: for the simulation, we used a version of SeM-Prepare that does not encrypt the 
binary; the simulator differentiate between the secure and non-secure sections using 
their names, so the security boundaries are preserved. 
A secure program is only prepared once, and the secret key's owner may send it to SeM 
for execution multiple times. 
  
 
71 
 
Chapter 6 Secure Distributed Shared 
Memory 
1 Introduction 
Adding support for multi node secure execution on SeM raised the need for securely 
sharing data between trusted nodes that are connected via an untrusted medium 
(Chapter 3). In this chapter we address this need. 
 
1.1 The Problem 
Security and privacy in computer systems are major concerns, especially when running 
programs on third-party systems such as public clouds, in which the user may be unwilling 
to trust the system provider and thus its hypervisor, operating system and even most of 
its hardware. 
Various studies [1,2,3,13,28] and industry efforts (E.g., SecureBlue++ [18], Intel SGX 
[22]) have attempted to maintain the secrecy of a program running on a platform of an 
untrusted owner. They all share a basic element: using encryption to preserve program 
secrecy. 
To execute an encrypted program, every secure system has a system-internal trusted 
area (TA) holding the data (and similarly, code) as cleartext, because operations that can 
be performed directly on encrypted data are currently very limited [61]. The TA commonly 
includes the processing core as well as data and instruction caches, and related control 
mechanisms. Information is encrypted by the user before being provided to the machine 
in the first place; it is decrypted upon entering the TA (into the cache), is encrypted 
automatically upon eviction, and is decrypted automatically whenever fetched back into 
the cache. Unfortunately, all this comes at the cost of added latency.  
For encryption of data being placed in (untrusted) memory, counter mode encryption 
[62] has been proposed. Data is encrypted using a keystream block (KB) [63]. The KB is 
calculated as a complex cryptographic function of the block address, a secret key, and a 
counter seed. Upon cache miss, the requested block's address is known; assuming the 
presence of the key and the seed in the TA, the decryption KB is calculated while the 
missing block is being fetched, requiring only a bitwise XOR with the arriving encrypted 
block. The memory access latency is thus used to hide that of the KB preparation.  
However, data encryption upon cache eviction has remained slow, as the KB calculation 
traditionally [62,64] requires the address of the block being evicted, which is not known in 
advance. Alternatively, one can pre-calculate and store in the TA dedicated KBs for some 
 
72 
 
of the cache lines (100% memory overhead for those). 
Most past studies assigned little importance to encryption latency of evicted blocks, 
claiming (rightfully) that a write buffer within the TA can be used to hide this latency. 
However, in a many-core system, eviction may take place in response to a request for the 
cache block by another compute core. If the cores are connected through an untrusted 
medium (E.g., PCB), the data must be encrypted for eviction, adding noticeable latency to 
block fetching. We therefore focus on this problem. 
General setting. We consider a multi-node distributed shared memory (DSM) system with 
a (per process) shared address space. Each node consists of a core with its private cache 
and memory, and the memory coherence of the system is managed by a central or 
distributed directory. The directory may be implemented in hardware or in software, but 
it must be trusted (discussed later). At any given time, a given block may reside in multiple 
private memories and/or caches with read-only permission. Once write permission is 
granted, a block may only reside in one private memory and its local cache. When a block 
is needed by a core that does not have it in its own memory, the core’s hardware turns to 
the directory for assistance.  
Due to unacceptable communication latency, many DSM systems scale to thousands of 
computing nodes by sacrificing memory coherence. However, recent technologies (such 
as Compass-EOS' icPhotonics [65]) allow low-latency communication that may enable 
coherent DSM systems with thousands of cores at the box or rack level, simplifying the 
programming model for many massively parallel applications. Fast security support for 
such systems is thus of interest. 
Throughout this chapter, we use core to denote a single threaded execution unit along 
with its private caches, security access control, and cryptography primitives. (Single-
threaded merely for facility of exposition.) We refer to the core requiring a missing data 
block as the requestor, and to the core holding this block as the sender. Although each core 
serves as both sender and requestor, we discuss these roles separately.  
1.2 Threat Model 
We consider a DSM system for many cores connected through an untrusted medium. A 
parallel program (that shares data among its threads) runs on the system, requiring a 
common key to be stored in the executing cores. A setup process is assumed to exist for 
securely distributing and storing such keys in the cores. The cores are trusted, and we 
assume that they are correct and their internals are physically inaccessible for snooping. 
An attacker with physical access to the system can inspect and record any off-chip signal 
and message. It can also change messages, replay old ones and initiate new ones. This 
applies to both data, commands, control, and coherence management messages (inter-
core or between cores and main memory).  
All other software, including other concurrently running applications, operating system 
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and hypervisor are assumed to be hostile. We rely on a secure CPU architecture (such as 
Intel SGX) enforcing by hardware correct process separation, permissions and data 
integrity using compartmentalized state within the TA; data alteration by hardware, as well 
as software security issues are treated by other layers, as part of a secure architecture 
(such as SGX). Furthermore, we do not create new problems in that respect. Denial of 
service of any kind is outside the scope, as an attacker with physical access may simply 
power the system down. Side channel attacks are also outside the scope, but we do not 
introduce new vulnerabilities. These settings are common in real world scenarios, and 
similar settings were addressed in [16,66,68]. 
In this setting, we strive to provide fast, scalable security support for directory-based 
coherent distributed shared memory.  Security includes preserving the secrecy of the 
user's program and data, and detecting any alterations thereof.  
 
1.3 Our Contributions 
We present a new approach for supporting secure coherent distributed shared memory 
(SDSM), which provides support for secrecy and integrity of inter-core communication. 
SDSM scales to thousands of cores while maintaining good performance. It can be added 
to secure CPUs using any variant of counter mode encryption, running either a trusted or 
an untrusted OS, such as SGX [22]. By using a TCM (a trusted coherence manager, 
comprising a trusted directory with added functionality), exploiting native latencies of the 
DSM system, and using a simple adaptation technique, we are able to dramatically reduce 
wasted work relative to prior art; also, SDSM scales with essentially constant per-core 
hardware resources. We assume a write-back cache and inclusive main memory, updating 
only modified blocks. We do not focus on any particular coherence mechanism, but 
consider MESI [69] as a common yet simple example. 
The specific contributions of this chapter are: 
• A new approach for using seeds in counter mode encryption with block-address 
independent KBs, obviating the need to supply initial seeds while preventing initial 
KBs from being reused during runtime.  
• A new seed management and distribution protocol for avoiding wasted KB pre-
calculation work, and exploiting DSM systems' communication latency for hiding 
that of the KB calculations. 
• Smart allocation of hardware resources to obtain a secure and scalable DSM with 
essentially constant per-core resources. 
• Establishing the need for a trusted coherence manager (TCM) to ensure correct 
coherence status and messages. 
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The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of 
memory encryption and related work; Section 3 presents our contributions; Section 4 
evaluates them, and section 5 offers concluding remarks. 
2 Background and Related Work 
This section reviews related work on counter mode memory encryption, mechanisms 
for memory encryption in multi-core settings, encryption seed management and 
encryption latency reduction schemes. 
 
2.1 Memory Encryption 
 Many systems [16,66,68] use Galois Counter Mode (GCM) [24], which is an 
authenticated variant of counter mode encryption. GCM relies on a running counter, with 
KB generation requiring a long computation, similar to counter mode encryption. For 
simplicity, we will consider the original counter mode as our encryption algorithm, but the 
ideas and results are easily adaptable to any of its variants.  
The use of keystream blocks for memory encryption simply entails encrypting k-bit data 
D using a k-bit pseudo-random secret R by performing a bitwise XOR: 𝐸𝐸 = 𝐷𝐷⊕ 𝑅𝑅. XOR is 
reversible: 𝐷𝐷 = 𝐸𝐸 ⊕ 𝑅𝑅, and is fast to execute. 
Recent implementations of counter mode encryption [70] use AES [71] block cipher to 
generate a pseudo-random number 𝑅𝑅 = 𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸(𝑃𝑃 , 𝑘𝑘), where P is a block-related seed, and 
k is a symmetric secret key. P is commonly defined as P = VA||S [62], which is the 
concatenation of the block's virtual address (VA) with S, a counter based seed. Having a 
unique VA ensures that each block has a unique set of P values, so AES guarantees that 
using the same key k, R is unique per block and does not repeat as long as S doesn’t. The 
seeds may be stored in the clear, as no attacker can reproduce R without knowing the 
secret key k.  
Only S must be stored per evicted block, along with negligible-sized metadata for 
locating it based on the block address. Together, their size is only a small fraction of R’s, 
resulting in reasonable storage overhead. (See [1,34,72,73] for seed storage and caching 
details.) 
Enc may be any block cipher algorithm, and P is padded with zeros up to the required 
size of Enc’s input. If Enc’s output is shorter than the data block, we use multiple Enc blocks 
𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠 = 𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸(𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠,𝑘𝑘), where 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 = 𝑃𝑃 || 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘_𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖, and concatenate all 𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠′s to form a KB of 
the required size [62]. The encryption's strength is the same as the block cipher's. The 
seeds are commonly initialized to 0, obviating the need for supplying initial values while 
maintaining a unique KB for each block.  
Using a proper design, the VA and seed of a missing block are known in the TA at the 
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time of a fetch request. (For simplicity, all the caches are assumed to be in the TA.) The 
calculation of the Enc function, typically shorter than the main memory latency, is initiated 
concurrently with the data fetch request, so the latency calculating the KB required for 
decryption of the fetched block is hidden by the memory latency. 
 
2.2 Multi-Core: KB Pre-Generation and Encryption Latency Reduction 
In multi-core settings, fast memory encryption is essential. Without it, remotely 
requested blocks will suffer from high eviction latency, which adds to their fetch latency. 
This problem was first addressed in [74] and subsequently in [75], but only for bus-based 
shared memory multiprocessor architectures, which are very restrictive and non-scalable.  
In order to address distributed directory-based shared memory settings, [68] suggested 
that each sender core pre-generate a seed and use it to pre-calculate a block-address 
independent KB. Upon eviction, this KB may be used to encrypt the block that is being 
evicted on the fly.  
A later work [66] added a central trusted global counting controller for all the processing 
cores, providing a trusted running counter for generating the seeds. It also added three 
buffers in each core: outstanding pre-calculated KBs (sender), KBs of recently fetched 
blocks (for re-encryption upon eviction if unchanged), and outstanding KBs for incoming 
blocks (requestor); this provides greater flexibility with stressful workloads. Its threat 
model assumes tamper-free memory management messages, allowing only data 
messages to be attacked, and that no management or coherence message is ever lost.  
In order to hide the decryption latency, a requestor must receive the seed that served 
to produce its encryption KB so as to permit calculation of the KB before the encrypted 
data arrives. [66,68] suggested sending the outstanding seeds to all cores in the DSM, so 
they can prepare the KBs in advance. As any KB may only be used to encrypt a single data 
block, in an N-core system each useful block transfer is accompanied by N-2 wasted seed 
transfers and KB calculations; this unacceptable waste of energy, memory and bandwidth 
moreover grows with the number of cores. Limiting the cache size for seeds and KBs at the 
requestors is also problematic, as it would reduce hit rate as cores are added.  
In [16], a DSM scheme with no KB pre-generation is discussed. Each block modification 
triggers the creation of an outstanding KB, kept temporarily with its new seed. Due to the 
large area needed per KB entry (roughly the size of a cache block), only a limited amount 
of buffer space is used for these KBs; if not found in the buffer, a lengthy process is required 
for fetching the current seed from memory and calculating a new KB. (KBs must not be 
kept outside the TA!) 
Lastly, [16] protects the integrity of seed and control messages by using a delayed 
timestamped message authenticating code (MAC), calculated using a cryptographic keyed 
hash function [67] with the program's private key. It is sent back as ACK to these messages 
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(piggybacked onto the next message) without adding latency to the critical path, so these 
messages either arrive correctly or a tamper event is declared. Data integrity is protected 
using GHASH [77], which is a lightweight MAC of GCM. We adopt the same integrity 
mechanisms in our work.     
All previous works failed to provide schemes that scale to many-core settings. Their total 
hardware resource requirement grows quadratically with the number of cores (because 
each core holds a set of every other core’s KBs), or else the efficiency of the existing 
resources drops dramatically as the core count increases. Previous works did not discuss 
the trust model for the coherence manager (such as a directory) for producing correct 
query replies. Finally, they did not address multiple concurrently executing secure 
applications; there, the limited resources cannot be replicated per application, so 
intelligent management is a must. We address all these issues.  
 
2.3 Seed Management 
In [66,68], block-address-independent KBs are used; this allows them to prepare one KB 
in advance and use it to encrypt the next evicted block. As the secret key is the same for 
all memory blocks, preventing KB reuse requires the use of different seeds for different 
blocks. To this end, a global counter was suggested, such that each seed value is only used 
once at runtime [66].  
For initial delivery to the secure machine, the data and instructions of a secret program 
are encrypted using initial KBs. Concatenating the block-address with the seed to form the 
KB (see III.A.) allows the use of zero as the initial seed value, obviating the need for 
providing the seed with the program. However, using block-address independent KBs 
raises a new issue: supplying initial unique-per-block seeds with the program (while forcing 
the GCC to refrain from using these values) will cost additional storage. [66,68] did not 
address the seed repetition problem presented here, nor did they discuss how initial seeds 
are supplied. We will present a new method that uses no initial seeds while still 
distinguishing among KBs of different blocks and avoiding KB reuse at any time.   
3 Secure Distributed Shared Memory (SDSM) 
In this section we present SDSM, our scheme for providing fast and scalable security 
support for directory-based distributed shared memory. We first present its methods and 
building blocks, and then show how these are put together. 
 
3.1 Seeds and Keystream Blocks  
 Our goal is to use block-address independent KBs, while using unique KBs both at the 
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beginning and during runtime. We present a simple yet novel approach for choosing seed 
values, deriving KBs form these seeds, and a heuristic for when to do so. Our scheme 
hinges on the observation that block-address independence is only required for modified 
blocks during runtime (for KB pre-generation), not for the initial encryption. This may be 
used in any secure system or CPU in conjunction with any variant of counter-mode 
encryption. 
We use 𝑅𝑅 = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀(𝑃𝑃,𝑘𝑘) as the KB for encrypting the blocks, with 𝑃𝑃 = 𝑜𝑜(𝑆𝑆,𝑉𝑉𝑀𝑀) padded 
by zeros to match the required input size of ENC. The function 𝑜𝑜 is defined as follows:  
 
𝑜𝑜(𝑆𝑆,𝑉𝑉𝑀𝑀) = � 0 … 00 ||𝑉𝑉𝑀𝑀    𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜 𝑆𝑆 = 0 \\ 𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠0 … 01 ||𝑆𝑆   𝑜𝑜𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 \\ 𝑉𝑉𝑀𝑀 − 𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶, 
 
with the seeds S at least the size of VA. Each block is initially encrypted using its VA as the 
P parameter of 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀(𝑃𝑃,𝑘𝑘); in subsequent encryptions, P is VA-independent and consists 
of the value of the seed concatenated by '1', so the resulting KBs differ from the initial KBs. 
Upon decryption, checking if the seed is equal to zero (and acting accordingly) takes 
negligible time. The seeds are initialized to zero. During runtime, the seeds are simply 
generated by a running counter, which increments upon each eviction of a modified block. 
(In Section 3.4 we discuss assigning and using these seeds with many secure CPUs, where 
we also increment the write counter for non-modified blocks.)  
 
3.2 Process-aware Keystream Block Pre-generation 
DSM systems usually serve multiple applications concurrently; yet, past work didn’t 
consider concurrent secure processes. In SDSM, each sender core receives seeds from the 
write counter or directory (discussed in Section 3.4), but pre-generates its own 
outstanding KBs using these seeds. Requestor cores generate KBs based on senders' seeds 
(received from the directory) and on the keys shared with them. 
Each sender uses a dedicated cache for holding outstanding pre-calculated KBs (as in 
[66]), which are subsequently used for encrypting remotely-requested blocks. Each secure 
process uses its own secret key (shared by its threads), so the sender should prepare 
outstanding KBs per process. Each sender core monitors past block requests, and learns 
from which of its secure processes they were requested recently. Then, the sender 
prepares outstanding KBs for these processes, favoring those that were asked for more 
blocks recently. 
Assuming constant per-core resources (regardless of the number of cores), and that 
each core may run many secure programs concurrently, this approach helps in better 
utilizing the core’s resources (compared both with generating KBs for every process 
running in the system and with so doing for every process that currently has active blocks 
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in its cache). 
 
3.3 Trusted Coherence Manager (TCM) 
Any distributed coherent memory system has a managing entity (such as a directory) 
that keeps the status of memory blocks and responds to queries about it. Some previous 
works ([66,68]) assumed that the related management messages are delivered correctly; 
[16] suggested a method for ensuring message integrity of both counter and coherence 
messages. However, to our knowledge, an adversarial coherence manager (directory) was 
not considered before. We next do so. 
Proposition: a trusted coherence manager is mandatory. 
Proof: Consider cores A, B, and C. Cores A and B share a block for read. Core A wishes to 
modify this block, but the adversarial coherence manager refrains from sending an 
invalidation message to B. When C requests this block, it may get an old version from B. 
[16]’s inter-core message integrity is thus insufficient with an adversarial coherence 
manager.                           □ 
Any coherence manager may be used; it simply needs to be placed within a trusted 
area. A distributed network of TCMs may be used, wherein each manages an address-
based fraction of the memory, as long as all these are trusted and we ensure that messages 
are verified for integrity and their reception is acknowledged. We also use the TCM for 
managing a per-process universal (write) counter for supplying unique seeds, and in the 
next subsection we will discuss using the TCM as part of the seed management system. 
With a distributed network of TCMs, for each secure process the seed-generation range 
must be partitioned among the TCMs to avoid duplication. Each TCM is thus assigned a 
unique portion of the seed-value space and, for every process, a unique portion of the 
virtual address space. 
 
3.4 Putting it all together 
We now present our hardware requirements and scheme for fast and scalable secure 
data sharing for a coherent DSM system, incorporating the aforementioned building 
blocks (some for correctness and others for performance and efficiency).  Specifically, we 
present a scheme whereby 1) KB calculation latency is hidden from the requestor; 2) little 
work is done for KB calculation; and 3) a small amount of hardware resources suffices 
even for large systems. 
We consider a DSM system built of many secure CPU cores (referred to in the threat 
model). Each core includes a trusted area used for the following tasks: it securely stores 
the application's secret keys (Section 1.1.); it implements GCM encryption, and treats 
seeds as described in Section 3.1. KB calculation time is assumed to be less than the core’s 
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local memory access time (though not required for correctness). It has a small cache for 
outstanding KBs (for sending), allocated per process as described in Section 3.2, and a 
single KB entry for receiving blocks (unlike [66]’s KB cache). It implements [16]'s integrity 
mechanisms (described in Section 2.2.), taking its latency out of the critical path. Figure 9 
depicts our core architecture. An additional memory encryption path may exist for local 
memory access (possibly address dependent, unlike SDSM), and it is architecture specific. 
One or more TCMs may serve the cores, and each TCM is responsible for a subset of the 
memory address space. (Figure 10).  
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Figure 9: SDSM core architecture 
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Figure 10: SDSM system architecture 
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Seed Management in SDSM 
Each cache miss results in a request sent to the requested block's home TCM for 
checking the block's status. This request also states its purpose – read or write. The TCM 
forwards the request to one of the cores presently possessing a current copy of the block. 
(When in shared read mode, the TCM may have a choice.) Considering the communication 
latency of requests between different cores and the time to calculate the KB, the KB 
calculation latency can be hidden from the requestor if 1) it gets the seed before it gets 
the encrypted data such that its KB calculation won’t delay its block decryption, and 2) the 
block owner uses pre-calculated KBs to instantly encrypt blocks that are being evicted. We 
do this as follows: 
(1) The TCM generates unique seed(s) (using a per-process counter) at a sender's request 
(for seeds), stores them in its (TCM's) cache, and sends a copy to the sender. Each sender 
maintains a short list of (block-address independent) seeds, and prepares outstanding KBs 
for future evictions. 
 
(2) A modified block that is evicted from its owner’s cache is encrypted using an 
outstanding KB (calculated using a seed previously received from the TCM). 
 
(3) Once the TCM receives a block request, it sends the first in line (oldest) outstanding 
seed of the block's owner directly to the requestor (latency reduction), and forwards the 
request to the block owner, suggesting the sender’s seed to be used. (This addresses race 
conditions among simultaneous requests). If the block is in the sender’s cache, it promptly 
encrypts it using the pre-generated KB, and sends it to the requestor (Figure 11). If it isn’t, 
the sender loads it from its memory, decrypts (using its cached seed with no added 
latency), re-encrypts with the pre-generated KB, and sends to the requestor (Figure 12). 
The sender may avoid re-encryption and simply send the currently used seed to the 
requestor (with the encrypted block); however, the requestor will not be able to use a pre-
generated KB, resulting in additional undesirable latency.     
Because we use the inherent communication latency to hide the seed transfer latency 
and KB generation latency at the requestor, the requestor only needs to prepare a useful 
KB upon need at no latency cost.  
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Figure 12: Order of events on a read request that encountered a local core miss: 
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Remark: Whenever the requested block is not in the sender’s cache, there is an 
alternative approach to decrypting and re-encrypting. Here, the sender may send the 
block unopened (and notifies the requestor for its origin), either similarly to a cached 
block (via its cache or some buffer, without altering it), or else remote direct memory 
access (RDMA) can be used to copy the block from the sender's memory to the 
requestor’s. The TCM does not know whether the block is in the sender’s cache or main 
memory, so unlike with the original approach, the requestor must prepare two potential 
KBs for any request (for the outstanding and the block-specific seeds). Therefore, the TCM 
should maintain a current list of all the block-specific seeds. Although this approach may 
save some latency by saving decryption and encryption and optionally using RDMA, it 
results in more space and communication to be used, and requires other extra work to be 
done. Note also that, with KBs available, decryption and re-encryption by the sender are 
carried out on the fly and can be pipelined, even down to single-bit granularity. We 
therefore prefer our original approach. (Moreover, RDMA usually requires operating 
system support, so the full benefit of this approach requires a hardware-only managed 
RDMA service.) 
 
Unlike previous work, we do not use a per-core dedicated KB cache for decrypting 
incoming blocks; instead, the TCM holds the seeds in its cache. Consumer CPUs presently 
have up to 8MB caches, and server CPUs may have ten times more [78]. Using 8-byte 
seeds and only half of the TCM cache for seeds (the rest is used for coherence 
management), we have roughly 0.5M seeds available in the TCM cache. Assuming 10 
outstanding seeds per sender, as far as cache goes, one TCM can serve up to 50k cores 
while providing seeds from cache. The compute requirement of a TCM is similar to that of 
a conventional directory.  
The number of cores per TCM may vary to match the expected workload and required 
TCM hit rate. Considering an extremely high hit rate for seeds in the TCM cache, our 
approach shows similar performance to that of a directory based system with no security 
at all.  
4 Evaluation 
In this section we evaluate SDSM for performance and scalability, and compare it with 
state-of-the-art work. We ran the PARSEC benchmark suite [48], focusing on applications 
that can scale to hundreds of threads. We used Pin [39] to capture the benchmarks' 
activity (instructions and addresses), and we developed a simulator that runs these 
activities on a multi-node environment, including our seed management and 
communication layer. The simulator is described in detail in the next section. Each 
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benchmark was executed with no security layer as the baseline for performance 
measurements, with [16]’s scheme (which to our knowledge has the most recent results 
published for similar settings), and with SDSM. The performance results are normalized 
to the baseline. In our tests we used 100 clock cycles for core-to-core latency, and 80 clock 
cycles for calculating the keystream block [16]. We used 10 outstanding KBs per sender. 
Unlike [16], which assumed higher communication latency as the core count grew, our 
evaluations of all the schemes assumed the same latency for every setting, so the security 
related overheads are fully exposed. 
We clearly see (Figure 13) that SDSM scales easily to a thousand cores with less than 
2.5% performance reduction, and less than 0.8% performance reduction with 256 cores. 
[16]’s performance drops by 22% with 1,000 cores, and by 16% with 256 cores. We saw 
no performance improvement when increasing the number of outstanding KBs per sender 
beyond 10. In [16], a sender only caches block-specific KBs for a few recently modified 
blocks, assuming that these are going to be requested soon. This approach suffers from a 
KB miss rate that increases as the number of potential requestors increases. We only 
assign a KB for a requested block upon request, so we practically never miss any KB.   
Next, we used synthetic benchmarks to assess the system’s behavior with various miss 
rates and core counts. Figure 14 shows that SDSM exhibits less than 0.3% performance 
degradation for any core count and miss rate, whereas [16] is sensitive to both (up to 25% 
performance reduction).   
We repeated with three different communication latencies: 50, 100, and 200 clock 
cycles. As expected, the performance penalty for calculating the keystream blocks (by the 
 
Figure 13: Running PARSEC benchmark suite: SDSM performance relative to [16], 
normalized to no security 
 
 
 
85 
 
prior art schemes) drops as the communication latency rises (Amdahl's law). We also 
evaluated the extra traffic caused by our scheme and found it to be similar to [16]. 
 
Overheads. Storage overhead is smaller than previously suggested architectures for the 
same settings [16,66,68]. The main reason is that we only keep a small cache for 
outstanding KBs (holding 10 entries) that will be used effectively, and only a single 
incoming KB per core. The number of cores assigned for TCMs is the same as would be 
used for a conventional directory, so we do not create new overheads there. 
5 Implementation 
In this Section we describe the simulator implemented for evaluating SDSM. This 
simulator provides a multi-node execution environment, where only the memory 
accesses are at stake. However, the level of memory intensiveness of the chosen 
applications affects the final performance results, so our simulator simulates the memory 
system accurately, and uses other operations (e.g., ALU operations) as spacers between 
those. 
 
We used Intel Pin [39] to implement a tool that converts a multi-threaded binary into a 
sequence of instructions of the form: ALU, Load [address], Store [address], where every 
thread has its own sequence. Then, we used this tool to simplify the PARSEC benchmark 
suite [48] into these sequences of instructions. 
 
We then built a simulator that takes these multi-threaded sequences as input, and runs 
 
Figure 14: SDSM vs. [16] normalized performance comparison for synthetic 
benchmarks with various node miss rates 
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them in a multi-node environment. In this environment, every node has its local memory, 
and requests for missing data (node-miss) are sent to a managing directory, alongside the 
type of request (read / write). The directory locates the current owner of the data and 
redirects the request to this owner. Besides running its local thread, every node accepts 
remote requests for missing blocks, serves these requests with the requested data, and 
acts on invalidation requests. For coherence, we chose the MESI protocol. 
 
We assume that operations are blocking, but an out-of-order version of the simulator may 
be developed as well.  Each operation takes a configurable number of clock cycles (ALU, 
memory access, node-to-node latency), and the end result is the total run time in clock 
cycles (until completion), alongside statistics that were collected.  
 
On top of this basic simulator, we added a security preserving layer that implements 
SDSM algorithm, and [16] algorithm. This layer modified both the compute nodes and the 
managing directory. 
 
For SDSM, we manage a list of per-node outstanding KBs (and seeds that were used for 
their creation), where seeds are fetched from the directory. A node that serves a missing 
data request uses the seed suggested by the directory for this request, and sends the data 
encrypted with the seed to the requestor. To save time, every missing data request that 
was forwarded by the directory also contains a new seed to be used on future evictions. 
Such arriving seeds result in KBs that will only be ready after a configurable number of 
clock cycles (to simulate real life operation).  
 
The directory manages the list of per-node seeds, and requests for missing blocks are 
replied to the requestor with the seed-to-be-used. Each requesting node that gets a seed-
to-be-used starts calculating a new KB for it that will only be ready after a configurable 
amount of time. If the requested data arrives before, it has to wait for the KB for the data 
to be decrypted. 
 
For [16], KBs are prepared per virtual address (not address independent), outstanding KBs 
are only prepared for blocks that are modified, and a storage space is used to keep those. 
If a block is evicted and no matching KB was found, then a seed is chosen and a virtual 
address dependent KB has to be prepared; to present [16] in the best light, we chose to 
send the seed right away to parallelize things with the requestor as much as possible. 
Unmodified blocks need to be fetched from the memory with their encryption seed, so 
these are sent together to the requestor. 
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The statistics that are collected: total clock cycles, average number of per-core 
instructions that were executed, per-core per-type (ALU, Load, Store) average number of 
instructions that were executed, node-misses, hits in wrong state (data is already there, 
but needs write permissions), number of requests served, number of requests that were 
redirected (directory forwarded but the data was already evicted for race conditions), 
number of requests that were served right away, number of requests that were delayed 
for eviction awaiting a KB, average delay (clock cycles) for those requests, number of 
requests that were delayed for fetch completion awaiting a KB, average number of delay 
cycles for those requests, statistics on the directory activity, statistics of the traffic. 
 
The simulator may be configured to run the baseline (memory is shared on the clear), to 
support [16] security method, or to support SDSM security method. 
 
6 Conclusions 
We presented SDSM, a novel approach for creating a scalable, secure distributed 
directory-based shared memory system. Exploiting native latencies of the DSM system, we 
are able to scale to thousands of cores, with a tiny performance degradation relative to 
non-secure DSMs. We are also able to avoid redundant work (relative to previous work), 
and thus save energy and make better use of memory space. SDSM will enable the 
construction of massively parallel secure and efficient directory-based coherent memory 
systems.  
Future work includes more detailed study of per-core resource requirements (e.g., 
energy and traffic) for an N-core parallel task, optimizations for non-uniform memory 
access (NUMA) systems, and supporting dynamically changing systems. 
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Chapter 7 Distributed Memory 
Integrity Trees 
 
Adding support for multi node secure execution on SeM raised the need for preserving 
the integrity of the distributed memory, where the local compute nodes and their 
memories are connected via an untrusted medium (Chapter 3). In this chapter we 
address this need. 
1 Introduction 
Secure computing in untrusted environments like public clouds is an emerging 
requirement. A common (e.g. SGX [22], SeM) assumption is that the secure CPU chip 
and the user's own code are the only trusted elements. Every-thing else, including the 
board and off-chip memory as well as the operating system (OS) and hypervisor, is 
untrusted. Encryption can protect the confidentiality of the data residing in untrusted 
memory, and message authenticating code (MAC) can protect against forged or 
misplaced data; however, replay attacks (whereby old data is maliciously restored) by a 
privileged attacker  may harm the integrity (version) of the data, and this requires 
additional measures. For this, various secure CPU-managed integrity trees are used; 
however, these only protect a program running at a single compute node, whereas 
many relevant application programs are parallel or distributed.  
Distributed applications commonly use message passing interface (MPI) [79] or 
distributed shared memory (DSM) [80]. In MPI, the memory space itself is not 
distributed, so the single-node integrity solutions suffice. DSM, wherein threads are 
spawned and access a shared address space for data sharing and synchronization, is 
natively easier to program and thus attractive. However, this sharing requires a 
distributed integrity-preserving mechanism. Also, since the DSM coherence state 
metadata is managed by the underlying (untrusted) OS, it is vulnerable to 
manipulations. (E.g., preventing the invalidation of a local memory block, causing the 
read of an old value; or granting write permission without remote invalidations, causing 
incoherent blocks.) Secure CPUs that protect at application granularity (e.g., SGX, SeM) 
cannot protect this metadata against privileged attackers, and solutions like AMD-SEV 
[87] lack memory integrity protection.  
In this work, we present the Integrity-Verified Local Coherence State (IVLCS) mechanism, 
which protects the coherence state of shared memory blocks against malicious 
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manipulations. We then present Distributed Integrity Tree (DIT), a novel scheme that uses 
IVLCS, any existing inter-node secure coherent data transfer layer (a coherence preserving 
layer that transfers data securely, e.g. SDSM or [16]), and any single-node integrity tree 
to construct a corresponding distributed integrity tree. Finally, we use DIT to construct 
distributed versions of Merkle Tree [72], Bonsai Merkle Tree [34], and of Intel SGX's [22] 
Memory Encryption Engine (MEE) integrity mechanism [81]. Although we target 
protection at a process level, DIT may also protect at a virtual machine level. 
The remainder of the chapter is as follows: Sec. 2 reviews single-node integrity trees; Sec. 
3 presents our new schemes; Sec. 4 applies them to existing integrity trees; Sec. 5 
evaluates them, and Sec. 6 offers concluding remarks. 
2 Single Node Integrity Trees 
In this section we overview integrity trees that are commonly used for single-node 
applications. All these will be extended by DIT in Sec. 4.  
Merkle Tree [72]. A secure hash (based on a secret key) is calculated for each memory 
block (data or instructions); the hashes are stored in the clear in memory blocks ('hash 
blocks'), in the untrusted memory. For each hash block, a secure hash is calculated, and 
this is repeated in a tree structure until a single (root) hash value is calculated to protect 
the integrity of the entire tree. This root never leaves the CPU chip, so it cannot be forged 
by an attacker. The use of secure hashes ensures that without knowing the secret hashing 
key, an attacker cannot forge a data block and calculate a correct hash for it. The use of a 
chip-resident root hash furthermore ensures that even if an attacker restores old data 
blocks with their old hashes, they will fail verification when read into the CPU chip.  
In many implementations, the hash blocks are cached on chip, so when a missing hash 
is fetched (from unprotected memory), it needs to be validated only up to the first 
ancestor hash that is already cached. Since the latter hash was verified when fetched (and 
possibly updated for subsequent sub-tree modifications), and is inside the chip so no 
attacker could have modified its value, it is treated as a root hash and the hash validation 
is completed. In case of block modifications, the corresponding hash block need only be 
updated upon eviction of the modified block. 
Bonsai Merkle Tree (BMT) [34] targets systems that protect their memory using counter 
mode encryption, wherein each memory block has its corresponding counter value. [34] 
observed that instead of protecting the actual memory blocks using a secure hash tree, 
protecting the counters by a Merkle hash tree and using a per-block secure MAC will result 
in a smaller hash tree, the Bonsai Merkle Tree, which provides the same security 
guarantees as the original Merkle Tree. The smaller hash tree increases cache hit-rate, 
thereby improving performance.  
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Each memory block has a small MAC alongside the data, so when it is fetched into the 
cache and decrypted by the counter mode technique (assuming a correct counter), forged 
data will result in a mismatch between the fetched MAC and the one computed over the 
fetched, decrypted block. Forging a counter (e.g. old counter with old data and MAC) will 
be detected upon counter block fetch, since BMT directly protects the counter blocks 
(similarly to data protection by the Merkle Tree). 
  The BMT values are stored in the clear in the unprotected memory, and can be cached 
in the chip. BMT cannot, however, be used as is for protecting a distributed program, 
because the program's memory space spans multiple memories that are controlled by 
different CPUs. 
Intel Memory Encryption Engine (MEE) [81] integrity tree is used in SGX [22]. In MEE, 
each data block has a version, and a Tag that is calculated using a MAC algorithm over the 
data and its version. The blocks of versions are protected similarly (using an upper level 
version and a Tag), and this continues in a tree structure up to a root version that is kept 
on chip. 
Unfortunately, a distributed program's memory space spans multiple memories, 
controlled by different CPUs, so none of the above can be used as is to protect it. 
3 Distributed Integrity Trees 
A single-node integrity tree is responsible for its CPU's fixed set of memory blocks. In a 
DSM, however, valid blocks move among nodes, so a collection of local integrity trees with 
fixed responsibilities does not work. Using instead a single root value (stored in one of 
the secure CPUs) to maintain the integrity of the entire distributed memory is impractical, 
because this value must change upon any write to memory, overwhelming both the 
network and the CPU holding the root value. A replicated global integrity tree is even more 
expensive to create and maintain.    
Our key observation is that, by having a secure coherent inter-node data transfer layer, 
each node need only 1) know with certainty which blocks are pre-sent in its local memory 
("locally resident"), and 2) only maintain the integrity of those. Specifically, each node 
must maintain an integrity-protected coherence state ("locally resident + write 
permission"/ "not resident") of all its shared memory blocks, be they locally resident or 
not. However, a node need not even be aware of changes being made to a non-resident 
block's content or location until it is fetched again. We next exploit this key insight. 
Definition. The local coherence state of a block is integrity verified (IVLCS) iff the 
coherence state of the block is protected by a local integrity preserving mechanism: when 
the CPU checks if a block resides locally, the results are either correct or an error is 
declared. 
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Constructing the IVLCS is done via the following modifications to existing integrity 
verified structures:  
1) Assign a special value 'NR' to mark a locally non-resident block (unallocated or currently 
present at a different node). 
2) Add a per-block write-permission bit (0-R, 1-RW).  
'NR' can be kept in the data block itself, in the leaf of the hash tree responsible for the 
integrity of this block, in place of the counter of this block (if counter mode is used), etc.; 
the write permission bit can be kept along-side. NR can either be marked using a dedicated 
value of existing bits, or using an additional bit (incurring memory overhead). In fact, one 
may use a partial integrity tree protecting only the allocated and locally existing part of 
the memory, in which case NR can also mark an unallocated or locally unavailable subtree 
(i.e., a block containing solely NR’s is omitted, and its predecessor hash contains NR, 
recursively). 
 
The Distributed Integrity Tree (DIT) scheme. 
 DIT uses secure CPUs that employ a secure coherent inter-node data transfer layer to 
protect the data while in transit, along with integrity verified local coherence state (IVLCS) 
and single-node local memory integrity trees to protect the data while in a secure node.  
The data transfer layer, embedded in the secure CPU, is responsible for trustfully 
locating the current owner of a requested block (e.g. by communicating with a trusted 
directory), and providing encrypted (if desired) and integrity protected data transfer 
between the current owner and the requesting node. Any tamper attempt is detected, 
and an error is treated by the trusted compute node.  
Each CPU has a single-node local memory integrity tree. Locally resident data blocks 
(along with their integrity-protecting metadata) are fetched into the CPU both for local 
use and for verification prior to being sent re-motely. The local memory integrity 
mechanism detects modifications of both data and integrity blocks (as done in single-node 
integrity trees). This also holds for local permission checks, which are integrity protected 
(by IVLCS definition). Non-resident blocks are determined properly (by IVLCS), so only the 
missing ones are re-quested from their remote owner. These are requested by the secure 
CPU, their current owner is detected, it sends them, they are received correctly, and are 
invalidated (when required) – all this by the data transfer layer. Having arrived, their local 
coherence state is trustfully up-dated in the local integrity structure, and these become 
locally resident blocks. DIT can thus be used to pre-serve the integrity of the entire 
distributed shared memory. It thus provides all the truly required functions of a global 
integrity tree at a cost and performance that are very similar to those of independent local 
trees. 
DIT was described with cache-block sharing granularity. For memory-page granularity 
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DSM, an in-CPU buffer can hold the rest of the page while updating its integrity, not 
delaying the availability of the requested cache line. Other approaches, like bringing the 
entire page into the local cache and marking it 'dirty', remain for future research. 
4 Distributed Tree Examples 
In this section we apply DIT to the three aforementioned single-node trees, yielding 
corresponding distributed integrity trees. For each, we choose the data structure that 
marks a non-resident block and write permission, and discuss its behavior. 
 
Distributed Merkle Tree (DMT). We let the hash corresponding to a data block (leaf 
hash of the Merkle Tree) contain the actual hash for an residing block, and 'NR' for 
unmapped blocks or ones currently residing only in other CPUs' local memory. (An absent 
data block could itself be marked 'NR', but its hash is smaller so hash marking is more 
efficient.) A per-block write permission bit is kept alongside the leaf hash, and is checked 
before a write operation. Since hash values are also kept in blocks, hashes of residing and 
non- residing blocks ('NR') may reside in the same hash block. A per-CPU local Merkle Tree 
is maintained normally, and each CPU maintains a local root hash of its local Merkle Tree. 
(See Figure 15.) 
On a cache hit, a block is accessed directly; if a first write is requested, then write 
permission is requested from the secure coherent node-to-node data transfer layer. On a 
cache miss, the block's hash (and write-permission bit) is examined. If the stored hash 
value is not 'NR', the block is simply fetched from the local memory; if it is 'NR', a request 
is sent to the data transfer layer for validating and then bringing the block securely (by 
definition). Once the requested block arrives, it is securely stored in the cache, marked 
'dirty', and its write-permission bit is updated based on the request type. Only when a 
'dirty' block is locally evicted, its hash must be updated, since until then the block is simply 
accessed via the cache. Similarly, upper level hash blocks are updated as soon as their 
children are evicted. If a cached modified block is requested by others, its write permission 
is revoked; its local hash is either up-dated instantly or upon eviction. If a CPU invalidates 
a block, its hash becomes 'NR' and the local integrity structure is updated similarly. 
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Distributed Bonsai Merkle Tree (DBMT). We construct DBMT with private per-CPU 
encryption counters (not shared), so other CPUs cannot access them, thereby avoiding 
redundant management (inter-node communication for counter updates even for inactive 
blocks) and potential false sharing. The counter corresponding to the data block either 
contains the actual counter for a resident block, or 'NR' for unmapped blocks and ones 
residing only in other CPUs' local memory. A per-block write-permission bit is kept 
alongside the counter (also covered by the MAC calculation), and it is checked be-fore a 
write operation. A per-CPU local BMT is maintained normally, and each CPU maintains a 
local root hash of its local BMT. See Figure 16. 
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Figure 16: DIT example: Distributed Bonsai Merkle Tree (DBMT). 
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Figure 15: DIT example: distributed Merkle Tree (DMT). 
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Distributed Memory Encryption Engine (DMEE). Although Intel SGX currently does not 
support distributed execution, we show that its MEE integrity tree can also benefit from 
DIT. The tree structure is fairly similar to BMT, so we construct DMEE with private per-CPU 
versions. The version corresponding to the data block either contains the actual version 
for a resident block, or 'NR' otherwise, alongside a write permission bit. A per-CPU local-
MEE is maintained normally, and each CPU maintains a local root version of its local-MEE. 
See Figure 17. 
 
Note that in DIT, migrating a thread to a new CPU does not require upfront data 
movement; rather, only an empty hash/version/counter structure, a new empty local-
integrity tree, and a root hash. The thread’s code and data will be subsequently fetched 
as shared data in the system. 
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Figure 17: DIT example: Distributed Memory Encryption Engine tree (DMEE). 
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5 Evaluation 
We evaluate the additional operations performed by DIT relative to a baseline with 
secure coherent inter-node data transfer (SDSM) and single-node integrity trees, but 
without coherence integrity (and therefore no global memory integrity). We consider 
memory sharing at cache block granularity, though coarser granularity is possible. 
Therefore, the baseline's OS must verify the status of memory blocks upon access. 
Consider the following cases: 
 
Locally resident block – cache hit. Both in the baseline and in DIT, a cached block is 
accessed directly for read. Before writing for the first time, write permission is first 
requested by the data transfer layer; however, an already modified block does not require 
a permission request. Therefore, performance is similar.  
 
Locally resident block – cache miss. In the baseline, a missing cache block results in a 
local coherence lookup to check for the presence of the block. It is then fetched and 
verified with the local integrity system. In DIT, the value fetched for the local coherence 
lookup (hash / counter / version) also serves for verifying the integrity of the resident 
block, so no additional overhead is caused.  
 
Locally non-resident block. In the baseline, a missing cache block results in a local 
coherence lookup to check for the existence of the block. If not resident, a data transfer 
request is sent, and the block arrives into the cache safely. The integrity structure is only 
updated when this block is evicted. With DIT, an integrity protected coherence lookup is 
performed, which is likely to be more costly than the local coherence lookup. Then, a 
remote request is performed similarly. 
The average read time for the baseline is:  
𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏 = 𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏 + (1 − 𝐻𝐻) ∙ �𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏ℎ + 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏ℎ + 𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸 ∙ 𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 + (1 − 𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸) ∙ 𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟� 
Where H is the cache hit rate, 𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏  is the cache hit time, 𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏ℎ is the average coherence 
lookup time, LE is the probability of finding a cache-missed block in the local memory, 𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓  
is the mean integrity verification time, and 𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟 is the mean time to fetch a block from 
another node. 
The average read time for DIT is: 
𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟 = 𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏 + (1 − 𝐻𝐻) ∙ (𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 + 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏ℎ + (1 − 𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸) ∙ 𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟) 
  
The difference between the two is: 
𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟 − 𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏 = (1 − 𝐻𝐻) ∙ (−𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏ℎ + (1 − 𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸) ∙ 𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓) 
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Performance differs only for cache misses, and the difference depends on 𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏ℎ versus (1 − 𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸) ∙ 𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓.  
 
  We evaluated DBMT’s overhead "synthetically" on top of a system with single-node 
BMTs and SDSM. We chose 𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏 = 1, 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏ℎ = 100 <clock cycles>. First, using 𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏ℎ = 0 (no 
overheads for the baseline’s coherence check) and 𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟 = 5 ∙ 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏ℎ, we evaluated the 
average memory access time (AMAT) overheads for the entire range of node miss rates 
(0-100%), where the high miss rates simulate intensively shared blocks; since [34] 
measured 1% cache miss for the BMT verification, we use 0-4% the for the DIT verification 
(Figure 18).  
 
We then repeated for 𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟 = 10 ∙ 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏ℎ (Fig 19) and 𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟 = 50 ∙ 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏ℎ (Fig 20). 
 
 
Figure 18: AMAT Overheard at Various Integrity Miss Rates, Hop Time Between 
Nodes Equals to 5 Memory Access Times. Baseline Integrity is Costless. 
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Figure 20: AMAT Overheard at Various Integrity Miss Rates, Hop Time Between Nodes 
Equals to 10 Memory Access Times. Baseline Integrity is Costless. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19: AMAT Overheard at Various Integrity Miss Rates, Hop Time Between 
Nodes Equals to 50 Memory Access Times. Baseline Integrity is Costless. 
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Results: not only is the AMAT overhead always less than 1%, it moreover drops to zero as 
the node miss rate rises.  
 
Next, we fixed the DIT cache miss to 2% (double than [34]'s, reflecting DIT’s slightly 
larger tree) and 𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟 = 5 ∙ 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏ℎ, and evaluated 𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏ℎ as a single memory access with 
miss rates of 0-4% (baseline's coherence check) and (0-100%) node miss rates (Figure 21).  
We see that, relative to a baseline with non-zero overhead for coherence check (𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏ℎ >0), DIT may even shorten the AMAT. 
 
To evaluate with real workloads, we used DBMT and ran the PARSEC benchmark suit 
[48] with 32, 128, and 256 compute nodes.  Figure 3 shows that the performance 
overhead is <0.5% relative to the baseline, with an average of ~0.2%. The node miss rates 
that were measured for PARSEC are up to 7% (canneal, fluidanimate), with 
memory/compute intensiveness of up to 45%.   
 
 
 
Figure 21: AMAT Overheard Compared to Various Baseline Integrity Miss Rates, 
Hop Time Between Nodes Equals to 5 Memory Access Times.  
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Figure 22 shows DBMT’s overhead, and per-benchmark locally non-existing rate. We 
see that DBMT’s overhead is <0.5% compared to the baseline with the single-node BMT.  
  
 
Memory overhead. A per-block bit in the local integrity tree's leafs is required to mark 
NE, and in some implementations this can be obviated (e.g., a DBMT counter / DMEE 
version may be set to its max value ('0xffff..') for 'NR'). As mentioned before, DIT supports 
partial trees by using a high level NE to compress an entire unused subtree, similarly to 
the integrity tree of the baseline. DIT's write-permission bit is merely moved to an 
integrity protected structure, since any DSM system must maintain that anyhow. 
6 Conclusion 
We presented the integrity verified local coherence state (IVLCS) mechanism, and used it 
with a prior-art secure inter-node coherent data transfer layer and existing single-node 
integrity trees to construct the Distributed Integrity Tree scheme (DIT). This enabled us to 
extend various single-node integrity trees (e.g., Merkle Tree, Bonsai Merkle Tree, and Intel 
SGX’s Memory Encryption Engine) into corresponding distributed versions (DMT, DBMT,  
DMEE), adding the capability to preserve memory integrity of a distributed shared 
memory sys-tem. While providing the extra security guarantees, DIT exhibits only a slight 
performance reduction across a wide range of runs, and only minor additional complexity. 
Furthermore, the local nature of IVLCS allows DIT-supporting systems to scale well. DIT is 
thus a major step towards high performance, scalable secure computing.  
  
 
Figure 22: DBMT performance overhead running PARSEC for different core count. Also 
showing percentage of misses served by other cores 
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Chapter 8 Conclusions 
In this thesis we presented the Secure Machine (SeM), a CPU architecture extension for 
secure execution on untrusted platforms. SeM is composed of several building blocks, 
some of which may also be used in other secure architectures.  
The basic Secure Machine (SeM) secures existing single-threaded binaries on a single core 
CPU, by using a Security Management Unit (SMU) that controls the cache and registers, 
and guards the cache from the execution unit access. By a novel binding of code and data 
that are under the same ownership, SeM assures that only the owning code can access 
its data in a manner that no other software, privileged as it may be, can break. SeM also 
approaches the CPU / OS integration, discussing interrupts, context switches, system 
calls, signals, and etc.   
To support single- and multi-threaded binaries running on single- and multi-core CPUs 
(CMP), machines with multiple CPUs, and many-computer systems, SeM uses SMU-to-
SMU secure communication, and hardware assisted secure thread creation, migration, 
and termination. SeM also supports heterogeneous systems that comply with a specific 
set of requirements. 
SeM assumes that shared libraries are embedded into the binary when preparing it for 
SeM, thus we discussed another approach in which shared libraries are not embedded 
(and therefore untrusted), and the secure program calling it will only reveals the data 
required for their operation. Furthermore, we provided a short discussion for the 
(assumingly) superior approach (in terms of security) of embedding shared libraries into 
the secure binary, and highlighted an inherent trade-off between these approaches. 
SeM relies on important building blocks for secure data sharing and memory integrity on 
multi-node settings. 
To enable secure data transfer between CPUs or computers that are connected via an 
untrusted medium, we presented Secure Distributed Shared Memory (SDSM), a high 
performance algorithm and architecture extension to support secure memory sharing 
between trusted entities that are connected through an untrusted medium. Using smart 
resource allocation and hiding the latency of cryptographic operations behind the 
inherent communication latencies, SDSM allows thousands of compute nodes to 
communicate securely with negligible performance reduction. Furthermore, SDSM is 
designed such that the amount of per node resources does not increase with the number 
of the participating nodes. This is a critical property, since one cannot expect a cloud 
owner to replace existing CPUs just to add more CPUs to its network. 
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To protect the memory integrity of a distributed secure program that runs on many CPUs 
or computers that are connected via an untrusted medium, we presented Distributed 
Integrity Trees (DIT), a method that extends existing single node integrity trees to 
preserve the integrity of a distributed memory. We have shown that DIT is easily 
applicable to three types of commonly used single node integrity trees, and that its added 
resources and performance penalty are both negligible. 
We designed and implemented SeM-prepare, a tool that instruments existing binaries 
and makes them SeM-ready, and SeM-simulator for running SeM-ready binaries to 
evaluate SeM’s performance. We ran the SPEC CPU2006 and PARSEC benchmark suites 
correctly (including C and C++ parallel workloads from various fields, and also AI, 
compiling and interpretation, and video and data compression). The performance 
reduction of SeM is less than 3%, and the added area and power are negligible. 
Jointly providing security, performance, backward compatibility, and furthermore 
supporting parallel and distributed programs and even accelerators, SeM thus provides 
security in a usable manner for general purpose computing. 
Topics for further study include hardware support for secure I/O, further study of the use 
of secure accelerators, direct support for scripting and bytecode supported languages, 
and using RDMA with SeM. 
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Appendix A: SeM-Simulator 
 
We implemented SeM-Simulator, to run SeM-ready binaries and evaluate their 
performance. While the performance results of SeM and ParSeM were reported in 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, respectively, in this chapter we focus on the simulator tool. 
SeM-Simulator runs SeM-ready binaries by simulating the SMU’s behavior. It was 
implemented using Intel Pin [39] just in time (JIT) mode that provides dynamic binary 
instrumentation for catching events and running handlers on those. Some of these 
handlers emulated the SMU behavior, and some collected statistics. Its main features are: 
• Distinguishes between secure and non-secure memory regions; 
• Maintains security modes (trusted / untrusted), including clear and restore the secure 
context on mode changes; 
• Enforces the SMU’s Secure Access; 
• Supports two stacks, one secure and another non-secure; 
• Supports all the SeM SMU instructions and enforces the trust mode required for their 
invocation; 
• Supports special call / syscall instructions for invoking untrusted code;  
• Collects statistics  
 
Being Pin-based, SeM-Simulator does not interfere with the normal operation of the 
program, just like SeM doesn’t. This means that the program is mostly executed normally 
on the machine, and only the SMU’s unique mechanisms are emulated by software. To 
allow the use of special SMU instructions, these are implemented using multi-byte NOP 
instructions, which consist of many free bits that we use for encoding the new 
instructions. The simulator tracks these instructions and runs a software handler when 
these are invoked. (On a real machine, these would preferably get their own opcodes.) 
 
Maintaining secure memory regions. SeM-Simulator keeps a list of secure and non-
secure memory regions. All the memory sections of the binary are considered secure 
(determined by querying pin for the low and high address limits of the image), except for 
the nosec_init and .plt sections. Memory regions that are outside the binary’s memory 
regions (e.g., shared functions or the code of the OS) are considered untrusted. SeM-
Prepare instrumented the binary’s memory allocations by an initialization instruction 
SMU_InitA; SeM-Simulator identifies this instruction and adds it to the secure memory 
region. Additionally, freeing a memory block removes it from the secure memory region.  
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Security modes. The security modes of the program are maintained, where the available 
modes are trusted and untrusted. Each instruction is checked for its address before it is 
executed; an instruction from a secure memory region is considered secure, and an 
instruction from a non-secure region is considered non-secure. A secure instruction that 
tries to run in trusted mode is simply granted, and similarly a non-secure instruction that 
tries to run in untrusted mode.  A non-secure instruction that tries to run in trusted mode 
causes a mode switch to untrusted, during which the context is saved aside, the registers 
are cleared, and the stack pointer is changed to the non-secure stack, and the instruction 
is set to run. A secure instruction that tries to run in untrusted mode causes a mode switch 
to Trusted, during which the registers are recovered, and the instruction is set to run.  
 
Memory access (Secure Access). Each memory instruction (load / store / push / pop) is 
checked for its target; instructions that try to access a memory region that does not match 
the instruction’s source region are blocked, and the program is halted. Special memory 
instructions (SMU_StoreNA / SMU_LoadNA) are only allowed to run if secure, and these 
are allowed to access non-secure memory regions. 
 
Special stack operations. SMU_PopNA and SMU_PushNA instructions are only allowed 
to run if they are secure. These instructions access the non-secure stack (inactive at the 
time of invocation), so aside from accessing non-secure memory running these also 
modifies the non-active stack register to be restored upon switching to untrusted mode. 
 
Calling untrusted code. SeM-Simulator supports SMU_syscall and  SMU_CallNoSec(i); 
once these instructions are invoked, the next mode switch to untrusted will not clear the 
desired number of argument registers, and the return address will be put in the non-
secure stack (so returning is allowed). Furthermore, on the following mode switch to 
trusted, the return value register will not be restored, so values can be returned to the 
secure code. 
 
Non-secure code that calls secure code. For maintaining the flow of operation of the 
secure program, non-secure code may only return to the secure code on points that it left 
before. E.g., secure code that invoked a non-secure function is allowed to return to the 
instruction following the original call instruction. However, secure applications will most 
likely start by invoking non-secure code that will use call to invoke the secure part of the 
program. On the first non-secure call that invokes a secure function, SeM-Simulator will 
store the return address in the secure stack, so when the secure program finishes it may 
return to its original non-secure caller. 
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Collection of statistics. SeM-Simulator collects many statistics on the program while 
being executed: number of instructions executed, mode switches, thread creations, 
dynamic memory allocations and the average allocated size, I/Os (sys_read and sys_write 
system calls). 
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Appendix B: SeM Instruction Set 
 
The SMU operation requires instructions that are accessible to all users but do not leak 
data or secret keys. As the SMU instructions can change important security settings that 
may or may not be accessed by subsequent instructions, they are treated as barriers in 
out-of-order or speculative execution. Table 3 provides their formal definitions. 
 
Instruction Explanation Only run 
if Auth 
Setup and Results   
SMU_GenKeys () Generate a pair of public-private keys 
(PbK, PrK). Optimization: prepare 
beforehand and store in a FIFO. Return 
Value: PbK, signed by the SMU. 
N 
SMU_StoreKeys (PbK, 
enc[SymK &&  HashK], phash, 
FirstLEP) 
RSA decrypt enc[Skey && Mkey,by PbK] 
using PrK and store the keys, phash, and 
FirstLEP in an empty table entry. 
N 
SMU_SetPID (phash) If no table entry with phash exists, report 
an error; else, set the current PID in the 
found entry. Destroy any remnants of an 
existing SMU entry with the same PID, and 
purge such blocks in the cache. 
N 
SMU_GetResults (PID, rand) Returns PID's error status padded by rand 
and signed & encrypted w. Skey & Mkey. 
N 
Context Switch   
SMU_EvictContext () Stores the content of the SMU Sealed 
Storage in the secure process memory. 
N 
SMU_RestoreContext (PID) Loads the content of the SMU sealed 
storage from the secure process memory. 
N 
Memory Access Instructions   
SMU_StoreNA (address, data) Stores data into a memory block 
regardless of the block’s Auth status, and 
sets its Auth bit to False. 
Y 
SMU_LoadNA (address) Loads data from a memory block whose 
Auth bit is False. 
Y 
SMU_InitA(addr, size) Fills a memory block with '0's regardless of 
its Auth status, and sets its Auth bit to 
True. Used in conjunction with write-no-
allocate 
Y 
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SMU_PushNA Pushes data into the non secure stack, 
regardless of its Auth status, and sets its 
memory block’s Auth bit to False 
Y 
SMU_Pop_NA Pops data from the non secure stack, 
regardless of its memory block’s Auth 
status. 
Y 
Special Call Instructions   
SMU_syscall (argnum) Invokes a system call, and leaves argnum 
register-arguments in place on mode 
change 
Y 
SMU_CallNoSec(i) Similar to call, with three minor 
differences: 1) (only) the first i register 
arguments will not be cleared in the next 
switch to Untrusted mode; 2) the return 
address is pushed into the NSS instead of 
the SS; and 3) the next switch to Trusted 
mode will not clear the register used as 
return value 
Y 
Tread Management  
 
  
SMU_NewThread() Prepares a new TSC with its following 
address as LEP. Returns SCID. 
Y 
SMU_NewThreadDelete(SCID) Deletes a new TSC of ID=SCID 
 
N 
SMU_NewThreadAttach(TID, 
addr) 
Attaches a new TSC with LEP addr to a 
thread with ID=TID 
N 
SMU_ThreadDelete(TID) Deletes an existing TSC of thread with ID 
TID 
N 
SMU_MigrateEntry(Phash, 
Target) 
Migrates a new entry with Phash to Target 
machine 
N 
SMU_MigrateThread(PID, 
TID, addr, Target) 
Migrates thread TID (if active) or with 
LEP=addr (if not active yet) of process PID, 
to Target machine 
N 
 
Table 3: SeM instruction set 
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